The Case Against Qualified Immunity by Schwartz, Joanna C
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 93 | Issue 5 Article 2
8-2018
The Case Against Qualified Immunity
Joanna C. Schwartz
UCLA School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Common Law Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Law Review at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre
Dame Law Review by an authorized editor of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
93 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1797 (2018)
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-5\NDL502.txt unknown Seq: 1 30-JUL-18 14:35
THE  CASE  AGAINST  QUALIFIED  IMMUNITY
Joanna C. Schwartz*
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1798 R
I. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY HAS NO BASIS IN THE COMMON LAW . . 1801 R
II. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOES NOT ACHIEVE ITS INTENDED
POLICY GOALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1803 R
A. Qualified Immunity Does Not Shield Officers from Financial
Burdens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1804 R
B. Qualified Immunity Does Not Shield Officers from Burdens of
Litigation in Filed Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1808 R
C. Qualified Immunity Does Not Protect Against Overdeterrence 1811 R
III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY RENDERS THE CONSTITUTION
HOLLOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1814 R
IV. ALTERNATIVE DEFENSES OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY ARE
UNPERSUASIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1820 R
A. Qualified Immunity Cannot Be Justified as a Protection for
Government Budgets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1821 R
B. Qualified Immunity Cannot Be Justified as a Tool to Expand
Constitutional Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1826 R
C. Qualified Immunity Cannot Be Justified as a Prefiling Filter 1831 R
V. MOVING FORWARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1832 R
A. The Supreme Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1832 R
B. Lower Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1835 R
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1836 R
APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1840 R
© 2018 Joanna C. Schwartz.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.  Thanks to participants in the Courts and
Legal Process Workshop at Columbia Law School, and to William Baude, Karen Blum, Sam
Bray, Alan Chen, Sharon Dolovich, Richard Fallon, John Jeffries, Richard Re, Alexander
Reinert, Dan Schwartz, Matthew Shapiro, and Stephen Yeazell for thoughtful comments on
earlier drafts.  Thanks also to Aaron Nielson and Christopher Walker for sharing their data
on circuit court qualified immunity decisions.  For research assistance, many thanks to
David Koller and David Schmutzer, and to the expert research staff at UCLA’s Hugh &
Hazel Darling Law Library.  Finally, thanks to Notre Dame Law Review for inviting me to
contribute to their annual Federal Courts, Practice & Procedure issue.
1797
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-5\NDL502.txt unknown Seq: 2 30-JUL-18 14:35
1798 notre dame law review [vol. 93:5
INTRODUCTION
In many ways, qualified immunity’s shield against government damages
liability is stronger than ever.  The United States Supreme Court has made
clear that qualified immunity should protect “all but the plainly incompetent
or those who knowingly violate the law.”1  The Court dedicates an outsized
portion of its docket to reviewing—and virtually always reversing—denials of
qualified immunity in the lower courts.2  In these decisions, the Court regu-
larly chides courts for denying qualified immunity motions given the impor-
tance of the doctrine “to society as a whole.”3  And the Court’s recent
qualified immunity decisions make it seem nearly impossible to find clearly
established law that would defeat the defense.4
But there are also cracks in qualified immunity’s armor.  Most recently,
in his concurrence in Ziglar v. Abbasi, Justice Thomas criticized the doctrine
for bearing little resemblance to the common law at the time the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 became law, and for being defined by “precisely the sort of ‘free-
wheeling policy choice[s]’ that we have previously disclaimed the power to
make.”5  Indeed, Justice Thomas recommended that “[i]n an appropriate
case, we should reconsider our qualified immunity jurisprudence.”6  Much
attention has been paid to Justice Thomas’s call to reconsider qualified
immunity doctrine in Ziglar.7  But Justices have been raising questions about
1 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
2 See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 82 (2018)
(observing that the Supreme Court has decided thirty qualified immunity cases since 1982,
and has found that defendants violated clearly established law in just two of those cases).
The Court’s recent decisions in District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018), and
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018), puts the count at thirty-two.  Twenty of those
decisions have been issued within the past ten years.  If one includes cases in which quali-
fied immunity is invoked less directly, the count would be higher. See, e.g., Tolan v. Cotton,
134 S. Ct. 1861 (2014); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
3 See, e.g., White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551–52 (2017) (“In the last five years, this
Court has issued a number of opinions reversing federal courts in qualified immunity
cases.  The Court has found this necessary both because qualified immunity is important to
‘society as a whole,’ and because as ‘an immunity from suit,’ qualified immunity ‘is effec-
tively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.’  Today it is again necessary to
reiterate the longstanding principle that ‘clearly established law’ should not be defined ‘at
a high level of generality.’” (first quoting City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S.
Ct. 1765, 1774 n.3 (2015); then quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 233, 231 (2009)));
Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1774 n.3 (“Because of the importance of qualified immunity ‘to soci-
ety as a whole,’ the Court often corrects lower courts when they wrongly subject individual
officers to liability.” (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982))).
4 See infra notes 109–12 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s recent quali-
fied immunity decisions).
5 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) (alteration
in original) (quoting Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 363 (2012)).
6 Id. at 1872.
7 See, e.g., Will Baude, “In an Appropriate Case, We Should Reconsider Our Qualified Immu-
nity Jurisprudence,” WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 19, 2017), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/19/in-an-appropriate-case-
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-5\NDL502.txt unknown Seq: 3 30-JUL-18 14:35
2018] the  case  against  qualified  immunity 1799
qualified immunity for decades.  In 1997, Justice Breyer suggested that
defendants should not be protected by qualified immunity if they are certain
to be shielded from financial liability by their employer.8  In 1992, Justice
Kennedy indicated that qualified immunity doctrine might be unnecessary to
shield government defendants from trial given the Court’s summary judg-
ment jurisprudence.9  In 2015, and again in 2018, Justice Sotomayor
expressed concern that the Court’s qualified immunity decisions contribute
to a culture of police violence.10
If the Court did find an appropriate case to reconsider qualified immu-
nity, and took seriously available evidence about qualified immunity’s histori-
cal precedents and current operation, the Court could not justify the
continued existence of the doctrine in its current form.  Ample evidence
undermines the purported common-law foundations for qualified immu-
nity.11  Research examining contemporary civil rights litigation against state
and local law enforcement shows that qualified immunity also fails to achieve
its intended policy aims.  Qualified immunity does not shield individual
we-should-reconsider-our-qualified-immunity-jurisprudence/?utm_term=.18443bf27fbd
(describing Justice Thomas’s concurrence as offering “some promising skepticism . . .
about the doctrine of qualified immunity”); Matt Ford, American Policing Goes to the Supreme
Court, ATLANTIC (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/
supreme-court-carpenter-cases/541524/ (describing Justice Thomas’s concurrence as “a
glimmer of light . . . for qualified-immunity critics”); Perry Grossman, Clarence Thomas to the
Rescue?, SLATE (June 21, 2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurispru-
dence/2017/06/in_ziglar_v_abbasi_clarence_thomas_signals_his_support_for_civil_rights
.html (describing Justice Thomas’s concurrence as “the most direct call for change [of
qualified immunity doctrine] to date”).
8 See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 411 (1997) (concluding that private
prison guards are not entitled to qualified immunity in part because “insurance increases
the likelihood of employee indemnification and to that extent reduces the employment-
discouraging fear of unwarranted liability potential applicants face”).
9 See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 171 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Harlow was
decided at a time when the standards applicable to summary judgment made it difficult for
a defendant to secure summary judgment regarding a factual question such as subjective
intent, even when the plaintiff bore the burden of proof on the question; and in Harlow we
relied on that fact in adopting an objective standard for qualified immunity.  However,
subsequent clarifications to summary-judgment law have alleviated that problem . . . .”
(citations omitted)).
10 See Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 316 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“When
Mullenix confronted his superior officer after the shooting, his first words were, ‘How’s
that for proactive?’ . . .  [T]he comment seems to me revealing of the culture this Court’s
decision supports when it calls it reasonable—or even reasonably reasonable—to use
deadly force for no discernible gain and over a supervisor’s express order to ‘stand by.’  By
sanctioning a ‘shoot first, think later’ approach to policing, the Court renders the protec-
tions of the Fourth Amendment hollow.”); see also Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162
(2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision reversing
the Ninth Circuit’s denial of qualified immunity for an officer who shot a woman holding a
knife “tells officers that they can shoot first and think later, and it tells the public that
palpably unreasonable conduct will go unpunished”).
11 See infra Part I for further discussion of this argument.
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officers from financial liability.12  It almost never shields government officials
from costs and burdens associated with discovery and trial in filed cases.13
And it appears unnecessary to encourage vigorous enforcement of the law.14
The Court could, alternatively, overhaul or eliminate qualified immunity
because—as Justice Sotomayor has observed—its application all too often
“renders the protections of the Fourth Amendment hollow.”15  Although few
cases are dismissed on qualified immunity grounds, multiple aspects of the
doctrine—including its disregard of officers’ bad faith, exacting require-
ments to clearly establish the law, and license to courts to grant qualified
immunity without ruling on the underlying constitutional claims—hamper
the development of constitutional law and may send the message that officers
can disregard the law without consequence.  The fact that qualified immunity
doctrine fails to protect government officials from financial liability or other
burdens of suit makes the doctrine’s imbalance between government and
individual interests especially concerning and unwarranted.
If a majority of the Court is convinced by one or more of these argu-
ments, they should restrict or do away with the qualified immunity defense
altogether.  In fact, five of the Justices currently on the Court have authored
or joined opinions expressing sympathy with one or more of these argu-
ments.16  Why, then, has the Court continued so vigorously to apply the doc-
trine, often in unanimous or per curiam decisions?  In my view, the most
likely explanation is that Justices fear eliminating or restricting qualified
immunity would alter the nature and scope of policing or constitutional liti-
gation in ways that would harm government officials and society more gener-
ally.17  For reasons that I will describe elsewhere, I believe there would be no
parade of horribles were qualified immunity eliminated.18  But even if the
Court does not find my assurances to be convincing, unsubstantiated fears
about the future are insufficient reason to maintain a doctrine unmoored to
common-law principles, unable or unnecessary to achieve the Court’s policy
goals, and unduly deferential to government interests.  The Justices can end
qualified immunity in a single decision, and they should end it now.
12 See infra Section II.A for further discussion of this argument.
13 See infra Section II.B for further discussion of this argument.
14 See infra Section II.C for further discussion of this argument.
15 Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 316 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see infra Part III for further
discussion of this argument.
16 See supra notes 5, 8–10 and accompanying text (describing Justice Thomas’s concur-
rence in Ziglar, Justice Breyer’s opinion in Richardson (which was joined by Justice Gins-
burg), Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Wyatt, Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Mullenix, and
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Kisela (which was joined by Justice Ginsburg)).
17 For some alternative explanations for the Court’s behavior, see infra notes 220–23
and accompanying text.
18 See Joanna C. Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity (unpublished manuscript) (draft
on file with author).
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I. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY HAS NO BASIS IN THE COMMON LAW
Qualified immunity shields executive branch officials from damages lia-
bility, even when they have violated the Constitution, if they have not violated
“clearly established law.”19  The Supreme Court first announced that execu-
tive officers were entitled to qualified immunity in 1967.20  In that decision,
Pierson v. Ray, the Court described qualified immunity as grounded in com-
mon-law defenses of good faith and probable cause that were available for
state-law false arrest and imprisonment claims.21  The Court in Pierson
appeared to focus on common-law defenses available in Mississippi at the
time the case was filed.22  But, in subsequent cases, the Court has repeatedly
explained that qualified immunity is drawn from common-law defenses that
were in effect in 1871, when Section 1983 became law.23
Despite the Court’s repeated invocation of the common law, several
scholars have shown that history does not support the Court’s claims about
qualified immunity’s common-law foundations.  When the Civil Rights Act of
1871 was passed, government officials could not assert a good faith defense to
liability.24  A government official found liable could petition for indemnifica-
tion and thereby escape financial liability.25  But if a government official
engaged in illegal conduct he was liable without regard to his subjective good
faith.26  Indeed, the Supreme Court expressly rejected a good faith defense
19 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
20 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
21 Id. at 556–57 (“We hold that the defense of good faith and probable cause, which
the Court of Appeals found available to the officers in the common-law action for false
arrest and imprisonment, is also available to them in the action under § 1983.”).
22 See id. at 555 (making clear that the good faith defense that the court of appeals
recognized, and the Court extended to Section 1983 claims, was drawn from a “limited
privilege under the common law of Mississippi”).
23 See Baude, supra note 2, at 53–54; see also Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 383 (2012)
(“Our decisions have recognized similar immunities under § 1983, reasoning that common
law protections ‘well grounded in history and reason’ had not been abrogated ‘by covert
inclusion in the general language’ of § 1983.” (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
418 (1976))); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993) (asking whether immuni-
ties “were so well established in 1871, when § 1983 was enacted, that ‘we presume that
Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish’ them” (quoting
Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555)); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986) (“[O]ur role is to
interpret the intent of Congress in enacting § 1983, not to make a freewheeling policy
choice, and that we are guided in interpreting Congress’ intent by the common-law
tradition.”).
24 See JAMES E. PFANDER, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS AND THE WAR ON TERROR 16–17
(2017); see also Baude, supra note 2, at 55; David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for
Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 14–21 (1972); Ann Woolhandler, Pat-
terns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396, 414–22 (1987).
25 See James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnifica-
tion and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1924 (2010).
26 See Baude, supra note 2, at 56; see also Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States:
A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 463, 465 (2010).
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to liability under Section 1983 after it became law.27  The Court’s conclusion
in Pierson that a good faith immunity protected the defendant officers from
liability is simply “inconsistent with the common law and many of the Court’s
own decisions.”28
Moreover, even if one believed that the Court’s decision in Pierson accu-
rately reflected the common law, today’s qualified immunity doctrine bears
little resemblance to the protections announced in Pierson.  Although quali-
fied immunity was initially available to government officials who acted with a
subjective, good faith belief that their conduct was lawful, the Supreme
Court, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, eliminated consideration of officers’ subjective
intent and focused instead on whether officers’ conduct was objectively
unreasonable.29  Even when a plaintiff can demonstrate that a defendant was
acting in bad faith, that evidence is considered irrelevant to the qualified
immunity analysis.30  The Court has repeatedly made clear that a plaintiff
seeking to show that an officer’s conduct was objectively unreasonable must
find binding precedent or a consensus of cases so factually similar that every
officer would know that their conduct was unlawful.31  Defendants are enti-
tled to interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity denials.32  And qualified
immunity applies to all types of constitutional claims, not only claims for
which an officer’s good faith might otherwise be relevant.33  None of these
aspects of qualified immunity can be found in the common law when Section
1983 became law, or in Pierson.
To its credit, the Supreme Court has long recognized that it cannot
ground its qualified immunity jurisprudence in the common law.  Indeed,
thirty years ago, the Supreme Court acknowledged that it had “completely
reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the
common law.”34  The Court reformulated qualified immunity with a specific
goal in mind—to shield government officials against various harms associ-
ated with insubstantial lawsuits.35  In the next Part, I will show that qualified
immunity is neither necessary nor particularly well suited to achieve this goal.
But Justice Thomas has recently raised a more fundamental critique of the
Court’s turn away from the common law.
In his concurrence in Ziglar v. Abbasi, Justice Thomas writes that quali-
fied immunity should conform to the “common-law backdrop against which
27 See Baude, supra note 2, at 57 (describing Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915)).
28 Alschuler, supra note 26, at 504; see also Woolhandler, supra note 24, at 464 n.375.
29 See Alschuler, supra note 26, at 506 (“A justice who favored giving § 1983 its original
meaning or who sought to restore the remedial regime favored by the Framers of the
Fourth Amendment could not have approved of either Pierson or Harlow.”).
30 See, e.g., infra note 126 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court’s
decision in Mullenix v. Luna).
31 See infra notes 111–12 and accompanying text (describing these decisions).
32 See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526–27 (1985).
33 See Baude, supra note 2, at 60–61 (describing this as a “mismatch problem”).
34 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987).
35 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982); see also Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S.
158, 170 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Congress enacted the 1871 Act,” rather than “the sort of ‘freewheeling policy
choice[s]’ that we have previously disclaimed the power to make.”36  If four
other Justices share Justice Thomas’s view, then they could vote to limit quali-
fied immunity to those defenses available at common law in 1871.37  As the
discussion in this Part makes clear, conforming qualified immunity doctrine
to the common law in place in 1871 would require dramatically limiting qual-
ified immunity doctrine or doing away with the defense altogether.  On the
other hand, if five or more Justices do not mind that qualified immunity
doctrine currently takes a form far different than the common law in 1871,
and do not mind that the doctrine has been structured by the Court to
advance its interest in shielding government officials from burdens associ-
ated with being sued, then it becomes important to consider the extent to
which the doctrine achieves its policy goals.  I turn to this topic next.
II. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOES NOT ACHIEVE ITS INTENDED POLICY GOALS
When the Court created qualified immunity in 1967, it explained that
the doctrine would protect government officials acting in good faith from
financial liability.38  Fifteen years later, the Court expanded the list of govern-
ment interests advanced by qualified immunity to include protection against
“the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues,” “the deterrence
of able citizens from acceptance of public office,” and “the danger that fear
of being sued will ‘dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most
irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their
duties.’”39  In its most recent decisions, the Court focuses primarily on quali-
fied immunity’s presumed ability to shield government officials from burdens
associated with discovery and trial.40  The Court claims that qualified immu-
nity achieves these policy goals, but has offered no evidence to support this
claim.41  Instead, all available evidence undermines each of the Court’s pol-
icy justifications for the doctrine.
I have examined the extent to which qualified immunity doctrine serves
its policy goals in lawsuits filed against state and local law enforcement.  I
36 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) (alteration
in original) (quoting Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 363 (2012)).
37 Justice Kennedy has raised similar concerns, observing that because qualified immu-
nity was drawn from common-law defenses available when Section 1983 was enacted,
“[t]hat suggests . . . that we may not transform what existed at common law based on our
notions of policy or efficiency.” Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 171–72 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
38 See generally Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); see also infra notes 44–45 and
accompanying text.
39 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (alteration in original) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177
F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)).
40 See Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 15 (2017)
(describing these decisions).
41 See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (“The Harlow standard is specifically
designed to ‘avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many
insubstantial claims on summary judgment,’ and we believe it sufficiently serves this goal.”
(quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818)).
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have found, contrary to the Court’s assertions, that qualified immunity is
unnecessary to shield law enforcement officers from the financial burdens of
being sued because they are virtually never required to contribute to settle-
ments and judgments entered against them.  I have additionally found that
qualified immunity is unnecessary and ill-suited to shield government offi-
cials from burdens of discovery and trial, as it is very rarely the reason that
suits against law enforcement officers are dismissed.  Finally, available evi-
dence suggests that the threat of being sued does not play a meaningful role
in job application decisions or officers’ decisions on the street.
It could be that different types of government actors have different rules
on indemnification or that litigation against these actors is resolved in differ-
ent ways.  But this possibility does not weaken the case against qualified
immunity.  Law enforcement is a common defendant in Section 1983 cases,
and cases involving law enforcement have played a significant role in the
development of the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence.42
Moreover, given available evidence of qualified immunity’s failure to achieve
its intended policy goals, the burden should now rest on other types of gov-
ernment officials to show how they are different.43
A. Qualified Immunity Does Not Shield Officers from Financial Burdens
Qualified immunity has long been justified as a shield from financial
liability.  As the Court explained in Pierson, qualified immunity was necessary
because “[a] policeman’s lot is not so unhappy that he must choose between
being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has
probable cause, and being mulcted in damages if he does.”44  The fear of
damages liability has repeatedly been invoked by the Court as justification for
qualified immunity.45  But my research has shown that state and local law
42 See Baude, supra note 2, at 88–90 (showing that thirteen of the Supreme Court’s
thirty qualified immunity cases since 1982 have involved state or local law enforcement
defendants).  The Supreme Court’s 2018 decisions in District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct.
577 (2018), and Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018), also involved local law enforce-
ment defendants.  Accordingly, fifteen of the Court’s thirty-two qualified immunity deci-
sions have considered the propriety of qualified immunity for state or local law
enforcement defendants.  Another seven cases have involved federal law enforcement
officers.
43 I disagree with the view that the methodological limitations of these studies—
including their focus on law enforcement defendants—necessitate further research
“[b]efore calling for a blanket elimination of qualified immunity.”  Aaron L. Nielson &
Christopher J. Walker, A Qualified Defense of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1853, 1878 (2018).  Although empirical studies will always have methodological limitations
and there will always be additional empirical questions that can be posed and answered, all
available evidence supports the conclusion that qualified immunity doctrine does not
achieve its intended policy objectives.  The burden should now shift to skeptics to unearth
convincing evidence that supports a contrary conclusion.
44 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).
45 See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988) (“Special problems arise . . .
when government officials are exposed to liability for damages.  To the extent that the
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enforcement officers should have no fear of being mulcted in damages.  A
combination of state laws, local policies, and litigation dynamics ensures that
officers are virtually never required to pay anything toward settlements and
judgments entered against them.
In a prior study, I gathered information from eighty-one state and local
law enforcement agencies—including forty-four of the nation’s largest agen-
cies and thirty-seven smaller agencies—regarding the total number of dam-
ages actions naming an individual officer that resulted in a payment to a
plaintiff over a six-year period, the amount paid to plaintiffs in these cases,
the number of instances in which an individual officer contributed to a pay-
ment, and the amount the officer(s) contributed.46  I found that officers
employed by these eighty-one jurisdictions virtually never contributed to set-
tlements and judgments during the six-year study period.47  I additionally
concluded, based on correspondence with government officials in the course
of my research, that law enforcement officers almost never pay for defense
counsel—instead, counsel is provided by the municipality, the municipal
insurer, or the union.48
Among the forty-four largest agencies in my study, 9225 cases were
resolved with payments to plaintiffs, and plaintiffs were paid more than $735
million in these cases.49  But individual officers contributed to settlements in
just 0.41% of these cases, and paid approximately 0.02% of the total awards
to plaintiffs.50  Although punitive damages are specifically intended to pun-
ish defendants who act with “evil motive or intent,” or “reckless or callous
indifference to the federally protected rights of others,”51 officers did not pay
a penny of the more than $9.3 million that juries awarded in punitive dam-
ages during the study period.52  Indeed, I found multiple instances in which
threat of liability encourages these officials to carry out their duties in a lawful and appro-
priate manner, and to pay their victims when they do not, it accomplishes exactly what it
should.  By its nature, however, the threat of liability can create perverse incentives that
operate to inhibit officials in the proper performance of their duties.”); Harlow v. Fitzger-
ald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982) (reporting that “public officers require [some form of immu-
nity protection] to shield them from undue interference with their duties and from
potentially disabling threats of liability”).  This fear was also invoked by Justice Gorsuch
when he was on the Tenth Circuit. See Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1141 (10th Cir.
2007) (en banc) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The qualified
immunity doctrine . . . is intended to protect diligent law enforcement officers, in appro-
priate cases, from the whipsaw of tort lawsuits seeking money damages . . . . Before a law
enforcement officer may be held financially liable, the Supreme Court requires a plaintiff
to establish not only that his or her rights were violated but also that those rights were
[clearly established].”).
46 For additional information about the jurisdictions, my methodology, and my find-
ings, see Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 902–12 (2014).
47 See generally id.
48 Id. at 915–16.
49 Id. at 890.
50 Id.
51 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
52 Schwartz, supra note 46, at 917–18.
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government attorneys used evidence about officers’ limited financial
resources in efforts to reduce punitive damages awards after trial—argu-
ments that suggested officers would be personally responsible for satisfying
those awards—only to indemnify the officers after courts entered final judg-
ments in the cases.53  And on the rare occasions that officers did contribute
to settlements or judgments, their contributions were modest: no officer paid
more than $25,000, and the median contribution by an officer was $2250.54
No more than five of the forty-four largest jurisdictions in my study required
officers to contribute anything during the six-year study period, and none of
the thirty-seven smaller jurisdictions in my study required officers to do so.55
In the vast majority of jurisdictions, “officers are more likely to be struck by
lightning” than to contribute to a settlement or judgment over the course of
their career.56
Although officers virtually never contribute to settlements and judg-
ments, different mechanisms protect officers from financial liability around
the country.  Some jurisdictions must indemnify officers for actions taken in
the course and scope of their employment as a matter of law.57  Some juris-
dictions can indemnify officers, but are not required to do so.58  And some
jurisdictions prohibit indemnification of officers under any circumstance.59
Yet these policy variations do not lead to variation in outcome—regardless of
the underlying policies, officers virtually never pay.60  Cities and counties fol-
low state laws requiring indemnification when they exist.  When indemnifica-
tion is discretionary, cities and counties virtually always decide to indemnify
officers.  And when cities and counties prohibit indemnification, some gov-
ernment officials view that prohibition as relevant only to the satisfaction of
judgments and agree to pay settlements to resolve claims against their
officers.61  Other jurisdictions appear to indemnify their officers in violation
of governing law.62
Even on the rare occasions that governments refuse to indemnify their
officers, officers virtually never end up paying anything from their own pock-
ets for a variety of reasons.  When a city declines to indemnify an officer, the
plaintiff may proceed against the municipality instead.63  Some plaintiffs
53 See id. at 933–36.
54 Id. at 939.
55 Id. at 960.
56 Id. at 914.
57 See id. at 905 n.93.
58 See id. at 906 n.94.
59 See id. at 906 n.95.
60 See id. at 919.
61 See id.
62 See id. at 919–23.
63 I learned of one such example in interviews conducted for a related project. See
Telephone Interview with E.D. Pa. Attorney A at 10 (on file with author) (describing a
police shooting case in which the city of Philadelphia declined to indemnify the officer,
and the attorney proceeded against the City: “[H]e’s completely judgment proof.  He can’t
even hold a job, he worked for a couple of months at Home Depot and he got fired.  And,
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decide not to try to collect judgments against officers who are not indemni-
fied—presumably because the officers have limited personal assets.64  Plain-
tiffs sometimes agree not to enforce their judgments against officers in
exchange for post-trial settlements with the government.65  Plaintiffs some-
times challenge the government’s decision not to indemnify, but do not sub-
sequently seek to collect against the officer if they are unsuccessful.66  Other
officers have successfully challenged their employers’ decision not to indem-
nify; in these cases the plaintiffs were ultimately paid by the jurisdictions.67
An officer denied indemnification may assign his right to challenge the city’s
decision to the plaintiff in exchange for an agreement not to enforce the
judgment against the officer.68  And in two recent cases, the City of Cleve-
land denied officers indemnification for multimillion-dollar verdicts, then
hired bankruptcy attorneys for the officers to discharge the debts.69  In each
of these cases, officer defendants, their government employers, and plaintiffs
have responded differently to government decisions not to indemnify.  But
the result in each of these cases was the same—the individual officers did not
pay.
The Supreme Court has suggested, in another context, that qualified
immunity is unnecessary to protect defendants who are otherwise insulated
from financial liability.  In Richardson v. McKnight, the Court denied private
prison guards qualified immunity in part because, Justice Breyer wrote, pri-
vate employment “increases the likelihood of employee indemnification and
you know, I was left in a position where I had a pretty good case against him on the police
shooting, but it would have been futile.  I didn’t want to take a verdict against him.  I didn’t
want to take any damages against him.  So . . . I’m proceeding against the municipality and
we’ll see how that goes.”).
64 See Schwartz, supra note 46, at 929.
65 See id. at 921–22.  I recently interviewed an attorney who described a case in which
this type of negotiation occurred after trial. See Telephone Interview with N.D. Ohio Attor-
ney C at 8 (on file with author) (describing a case in which the jury awarded $200,000 in
compensatory damages and $450,000 in punitive damages against an officer; the city said
that it would not indemnify the officer’s punitive damages award; the defendants appealed
the verdict; and the parties agreed to settle the case for $200,000 plus attorneys’ fees, paid
for by the city, in exchange for the defendants’ agreement to withdraw the appeal).
66 See Schwartz, supra note 46, at 931.  I recently interviewed an attorney who reported
that, after he won a jury verdict against a Philadelphia police officer and the city declined
to indemnify the officer, the attorney represented the police officer in a case against the
city, seeking indemnification. See Telephone Interview with E.D. Pa. Attorney D at 8 (on
file with author).  The attorney lost in the state appellate court. See id.
67 See Schwartz, supra note 46, at 930–31.
68 See id. at 929.
69 See Radley Balko, Cleveland’s Vile, Embarrassing Scheme to Avoid Paying Victims of Police
Abuse, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/
wp/2016/01/20/clevelands-vile-embarrassing-scheme-to-avoid-paying-victims-of-police-
abuse/?utm_term=.a874f9fc1c31; Kyle Swenson, How Cleveland’s Trying to Get Out of Paying
$18.7 Million in Judgments Against Two Cleveland Police Officers, CLEVELAND SCENE (Jan. 13,
2016), https://www.clevescene.com/cleveland/how-clevelands-trying-to-get-out-of-paying-
187-million-in-judgments-against-two-cleveland-police-officers/Content?oid=4692049.
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to that extent reduces the employment-discouraging fear of unwarranted lia-
bility potential applicants face.”70  Likewise, the Court in Owen v. City of Inde-
pendence held that municipalities are not entitled to qualified immunity in
part because concerns about the “injustice . . . of subjecting to liability an
officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise
discretion” are “simply not implicated when the damages award comes not
from the official’s pocket, but from the public treasury.”71
State and local law enforcement officers are as insulated from the threat
of financial liability as are private prison guards, and as are individual officers
in claims against the government.  There should be no concerns about the
injustice of subjecting state and local law enforcement officers to financial
liability because the money to satisfy those awards comes from the public
treasury.  To the extent that Justice Breyer (who authored Richardson) or any
other Justice views qualified immunity as a doctrine justified by the need to
shield government officials from the threat of financial liability,72 evidence
that law enforcement officers virtually never contribute anything to settle-
ments and judgments entered against them demonstrates that qualified
immunity does not—and need not—serve this policy goal.  And there is no
evidence to suggest that other types of government officials face financial
liability more frequently.
B. Qualified Immunity Does Not Shield Officers from Burdens
of Litigation in Filed Cases
The Court has also justified qualified immunity as a protection from the
burdens of discovery and trial in “insubstantial” cases.73  In Harlow, the Court
explained that the resolution of constitutional clams “may entail broad-rang-
ing discovery and the deposing of numerous persons, including an official’s
professional colleagues,” and that “[i]nquiries of this kind can be peculiarly
disruptive of effective government.”74  The Court appears to have become
increasingly committed to this justification for qualified immunity doctrine.
In 1992, the Court wrote that “the risk of ‘distraction’ alone cannot be suffi-
cient grounds for an immunity.”75  But, by 2009, the Court reversed course,
explaining that “the ‘driving force’ behind creation of the qualified immu-
70 Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 411 (1997).
71 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 654 (1980).
72 It is unclear how strongly Justices currently on the Court hold this view.  In Sheehan,
Justice Alito’s decision for the Court noted in passing that the likelihood that the officer
defendants in the case would be indemnified was irrelevant to their qualified immunity
analysis. See City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 n.3 (2015)
(“Whatever contractual obligations San Francisco may (or may not) have to represent and
indemnify the officers are not our concern.  At a minimum, these officers have a personal
interest in the correctness of the judgment below, which holds that they may have violated
the Constitution.”).
73 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–17 (1982).
74 Id. at 817.
75 Richardson, 521 U.S. at 411.
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nity doctrine was a desire to ensure that ‘“insubstantial claims” against gov-
ernment officials [will] be resolved prior to discovery.’”76
If the “driving force” behind qualified immunity is to resolve insubstan-
tial claims before discovery, the doctrine is utterly miserable at achieving its
goal.  In a prior study, I reviewed the dockets of 1183 Section 1983 lawsuits
filed against law enforcement officers and agencies over a two-year period in
five federal districts.77  I found that just seven of these 1183 cases (0.6%)
were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds before discovery.78  Qualified
immunity is little better at shielding government officials from trial—just
thirty-eight (3.2%) of the 1183 cases in my dataset were dismissed before trial
on qualified immunity grounds.79  Although I do not know how many of
these 1183 cases the Court would consider “insubstantial,”80 the Court has
explained that it intends qualified immunity to protect “all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”81  Unless the vast
majority of law enforcement officer defendants are “plainly incompetent” or
“knowingly violate the law,” the doctrine is not functioning as expected in
filed cases.82
My data suggest that qualified immunity screens out so few filed cases
before discovery and trial because it is, in many ways, poorly designed to
achieve its goal.  First, qualified immunity cannot be raised by municipalities,
and cannot be raised by government defendants in cases seeking solely equi-
table relief.  In my study, ninety-nine (8.4%) of the 1183 Section 1983 cases
filed against law enforcement fell into one or both of these categories.83  Sec-
ond, courts should reject qualified immunity arguments in motions to dis-
miss so long as the plaintiff has alleged a plausible claim for relief, and
should reject qualified immunity arguments in summary judgment motions
76 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 n.2 (1987); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 685 (2009) (“The basic thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials
from the concerns of litigation, including ‘avoidance of disruptive discovery.’” (quoting
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment))).
77 For additional information about the districts and my methodology, see Schwartz,
supra note 40, at 19–25.
78 Id. at 60.
79 See id.
80 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
81 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
82 Id.
83 See Schwartz, supra note 40, at 27.  Some might wonder whether these filing prac-
tices are evidence that qualified immunity encourages cases seeking institutional and for-
ward-looking remedies.  This may be true to some extent—fifty-four of these ninety-nine
cases were filed by attorneys, and the unavailability of qualified immunity for these claims
might have influenced their filing decisions.  (The other forty-five cases were filed by pro
se litigants who were unlikely to know about these intricacies of qualified immunity doc-
trine.)  Some might view the encouragement of institutional and forward-looking remedies
to be a positive side effect of qualified immunity doctrine.  Note, however, that none of
these ninety-nine cases resulted in a court decision finding a constitutional violation or an
award of injunctive or declaratory relief.
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so long as the plaintiff has created a factual dispute about whether the officer
violated her clearly established rights.84  District courts in my dataset wrote
multiple opinions making clear that they understood qualified immunity was
intended to resolve cases before discovery and trial, but denying the motions
because the plaintiffs had met their burdens.85  Third, even when courts
grant defendants’ qualified immunity motions, the grants will not be disposi-
tive so long as additional claims or defendants remain in the cases.  In my
study, courts granted fifty-three qualified immunity motions in full, but only
thirty-four (64.2%) grants were dispositive; in the others, additional claims or
parties continued to expose government officials to the possible burdens of
discovery and trial.86  For each of these reasons, qualified immunity is ill-
suited to play the role the Court expects it to play in the resolution of consti-
tutional claims.
My findings also suggest that qualified immunity doctrine plays a limited
role in the disposition of constitutional claims against law enforcement
because there are so many other ways in which suits can be dismissed before
discovery and trial.  Courts dismissed 126 (10.7%) of the cases in my dataset
before defendants responded because the plaintiffs filed frivolous claims,
failed to serve defendants, or failed to prosecute their cases.87  Even when
defendants could raise qualified immunity, they often chose not to do so.
Defendants moved to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds in just 13.9% of
the cases in which they could raise the defense.88  In two-thirds of their
motions to dismiss, defendants did not include a qualified immunity argu-
ment.89  Qualified immunity played a similarly limited role in district courts’
decisions.  When defendants raised qualified immunity in their motions to
dismiss and courts granted those motions, courts three times more often
granted the motions on grounds other than qualified immunity.90  Defend-
ants were more likely to raise qualified immunity at summary judgment,
courts were more likely to grant defendants’ summary judgment motions on
qualified immunity grounds, and these summary judgment grants were more
often dispositive.91  Yet, even when defendants raised qualified immunity in
their summary judgment motions, courts more often than not granted those
motions on other grounds.92
Decades ago, Justice Kennedy recognized that the Supreme Court’s
qualified immunity jurisprudence duplicates other procedural barriers the
Court has erected.  In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court eliminated
consideration of officers’ subjective intent to facilitate resolution of qualified
84 See Schwartz, supra note 40, at 55–56.
85 See id. at 54–55.
86 Id. at 44.
87 Id. at 56.
88 Id. at 31.
89 See id. at 34.
90 See id. at 39.
91 See id. at 48–49.
92 See id. at 39.
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immunity motions at summary judgment.93  Four years after Harlow, the
Supreme Court issued three decisions that clarified and heightened the stan-
dard for defeating summary judgment.94  And six years after that, Justice
Kennedy observed, in Wyatt v. Cole, that those summary judgment decisions
might have obviated the need for Harlow.95  My research confirms Justice
Kennedy’s view.  District courts’ decisions suggest that the Court’s summary
judgment standards—not to mention its standards for pleadings and for con-
stitutional violations—largely obviate the need for qualified immunity doc-
trine to screen out cases before trial.
Further research can explore the role that qualified immunity plays in
the litigation of constitutional claims against other types of government offi-
cials.  But all available evidence indicates that qualified immunity does little
to shield government officials from discovery and trial in filed cases, and that
the doctrine is both ill-suited and unnecessary to play its intended role.
C. Qualified Immunity Does Not Protect Against Overdeterrence
The only remaining justification that the Supreme Court has offered for
qualified immunity is that it protects against overdeterrence.  The Court fears
that damages actions may “deter[ ] . . . able citizens from acceptance of pub-
lic office” and “dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most
irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties,”
and expects that qualified immunity will protect against these ills.96  Yet there
are three reasons to believe that qualified immunity does not actually serve as
a shield against overdeterrence.
First, available evidence offers little support for the Supreme Court’s
concern that the threat of litigation “dampen[s] the ardor of all but the most
resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching dis-
charge of their duties.”97  Multiple studies have found that law enforcement
officers infrequently think about the threat of being sued when performing
their jobs.98  Notably, many of these same studies found that a substantial
93 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
94 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986).
95 Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 171 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (declining to
decide “whether or not it was appropriate for the Court in Harlow to depart from history in
the name of public policy,” but concluding that he “would not extend that approach to
other contexts” because, although “Harlow was decided at a time when the standards appli-
cable to summary judgment made it difficult for a defendant to secure summary judgment
regarding a factual question such as subjective intent” “subsequent clarifications to sum-
mary-judgment law have alleviated that problem”).
96 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (second alteration in original) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle,
177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)).
97 Id. (citation omitted).
98 See VICTOR E. KAPPELER, CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICE CIVIL LIABILITY 7 (4th ed. 2006)
(concluding, based on several studies, that “the prospect of civil liability has a deterrent
effect in the abstract study environment but that it does not have a major impact on field
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percentage of officers believe lawsuits deter unlawful behavior99 and believe
that officers should be subject to civil liability.100  Taken together, these find-
practices”); Arthur H. Garrison, Law Enforcement Civil Liability Under Federal Law and Atti-
tudes on Civil Liability: A Survey of University, Municipal and State Police Officers, 18 POLICE
STUD. INT’L REV. POLICE DEV. 19, 26 (1995) (finding that 87% of state police officers, 95%
of municipal police officers, and 100% of university police officers surveyed did not con-
sider the threat of a lawsuit among their “top ten thoughts” when stopping a vehicle or
engaging in a personal interaction); Daniel E. Hall et al., Suing Cops and Corrections Officers:
Officer Attitudes and Experiences About Civil Liability, 26 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES
& MGMT. 529, 542 (2003) (surveying sheriff’s deputies, corrections officers, and municipal
police officers in a southern state and finding that 62 percent of respondents “either dis-
agreed or strongly disagreed that the threat of civil liability hinders their ability to perform
their duties,” but that “46 percent of the respondents indicated that the threat of civil
liability was among the top ten thoughts they had when performing emergency duties”);
Tom “Tad” Hughes, Police Officers and Civil Liability: “The Ties that Bind”?, 24 POLICING:
INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 240, 256 (2001) (reporting that a survey of Cincinnati
police officers revealed that “78.2 percent of officers disagree or strongly disagree that they
consider the potential for being sued when they stop a citizen”); Eric G. Lambert et al.,
Litigation Views Among Jail Staff: An Exploratory and Descriptive Study, 28 CRIM. JUST. REV. 70,
79, 81 (2003) (reporting that when corrections officers were asked whether civil liability
“influenced their decision making when performing emergency duties, 28 percent said
that it did, 63 percent said that it did not, and 9 percent were unsure,” and that “[m]ore
than 70 percent of the respondents indicated that civil lawsuits did not hinder their ability
to do their jobs”); Kenneth J. Novak et al., Strange Bedfellows: Civil Liability and Aggressive
Policing, 26 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 352, 360, 363 (2003) (finding
that officers “tended to disagree” with the statement: “when I stop a citizen one of the first
things that goes through my mind is the potential for being sued,” but that “22 percent
agreed or strongly agreed that they were cognizant of the potential for being sued during
encounters with citizens”).  Note that another study found that a higher percentage of
police chiefs were influenced by the threat of litigation when making decisions affecting
the public. See Michael S. Vaughn et al., Assessing Legal Liabilities in Law Enforcement: Police
Chiefs’ Views, 47 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 3 (2001).
99 See Garrison, supra note 98 (finding that 62% of a sample of fifty officers from state,
municipal, and university law enforcement agencies in Pennsylvania agreed with the state-
ment “[t]he police officer who knows he can be sued for violating an individual’s civil
rights is deterred from violating an individual’s civil rights”); Hall et al., supra note 98, at
541 (finding that 48% of respondents “either agreed or strongly agreed that the threat of
civil liability deters misconduct among criminal justice employees”); Hughes, supra note 98
(finding that 38% of officers believe the threat of liability deters civil rights violations);
Lambert et al., supra note 98, at 80 (reporting that 50% of officers surveyed agreed or
strongly agreed with the statement “[t]he threat of a civil suit deters negligent and unlaw-
ful behavior by public safety officials,” and just 14% agreed or strongly agreed with the
statement “[t]he threat of a civil suit hinders my ability to perform my duties”).
100 See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 98, at 25 (reporting that 52% of officers surveyed
disagreed with the statement: “police officers should not be subject to civil suits by citi-
zens”); Hall et al., supra note 98, at 538 (finding that 62% of officers surveyed “agreed or
strongly agreed that officers should be personally subject to civil liability for violating the
civil rights of citizens,” and that “72 percent agreed or strongly agreed that officers should
be personally liable for their negligence”); Hughes, supra note 98, at 254 (finding 57.2% of
officers surveyed disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement: “police officers should
not be subject to civil suits by citizens”); Lambert et al., supra note 98, at 79 (finding
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ings suggest that many officers believe lawsuits deter misbehavior by other
officers, but do not themselves think about the threat of civil liability when
performing their duties.
Second, to the extent that people are deterred from becoming police
officers and officers are deterred from vigorously enforcing the law, available
evidence suggests the threat of civil liability is not the cause.  Instead, depart-
ments’ difficulty recruiting officers has been attributed to high-profile shoot-
ings, negative publicity about the police, strained relationships with
communities of color, tight budgets, low unemployment rates, and the reduc-
tion of retirement benefits.101  Similarly, a recent survey found that a major-
ity of officers believe recent high-profile shootings of Black men—not civil
suits or the threat of liability—have made their job harder and discouraged
them from stopping and questioning people they consider suspicious.102
Finally, assuming for the sake of argument that the threat of liability
deters officers, it is far from clear that qualified immunity could mitigate
those deterrent effects.  Presumably, the Court expects that the threat of
financial sanctions and the burdens associated with participating in discovery
and trial discourage people from applying for government positions or chill
officer behavior on the job.  And presumably the Court believes that quali-
fied immunity limits those negative effects of lawsuits by shielding govern-
ment officials from financial liability and the burdens of litigation.  But I have
shown that indemnification practices and litigation dynamics already shield
government officials from financial sanctions, obviating the need for quali-
fied immunity to serve that role.  I have also shown that qualified immunity
“[a]lmost 59 percent [of jail staff surveyed] believed that public safety officers should be
subject to civil suits for violating the rights of citizens”); Novak et al., supra note 98, at 364
(finding that “[t]he preponderance of officers disagreed with the statement that ‘officers
should not be subject to civil suits by citizens’”); Vaughn et al., supra note 98 (finding that
92% of police chiefs surveyed believed officers should be subject to civil suits).
101 See, e.g., Yamiche Alcindor & Nick Penzenstadler, Police Redouble Efforts to Recruit
Diverse Officers, USA TODAY (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/
01/21/police-redoubling-efforts-to-recruit-diverse-officers/21574081 (describing “tight
budgets and strained relationships with communities of color” as the reasons police depart-
ments have struggled to meet their goals of diversifying their police departments); Daniel
Denvir, Who Wants to Be a Police Officer?, CITYLAB (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.citylab.com/
crime/2015/04/who-wants-to-be-a-police-officer/391017 (reporting Chuck Wexler, the
executive director of the Police Executive Research Forum, as saying: “[A]ll of the negative
images of the police have made it more difficult to hire and recruit candidates into this
profession”); Oliver Yates Libaw, Police Face Severe Shortage of Recruits, ABC NEWS (July 10,
2016), http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=96570 (attributing the low rate of police
applicants to low unemployment, relatively low law enforcement salaries, and rigorous
physical and psychological tests and other prerequisites for law enforcement jobs); William
J. Woska, Police Officer Recruitment—A Decade Later, POLICE CHIEF MAG. (Apr. 2016), http://
www.policechiefmagazine.org/police-officer-recruitment/ (describing a number of chal-
lenges of officer recruitment, including bad publicity, community anger, job competition
from the technology sector, the recession, and the reduction in law enforcement retire-
ment benefits).
102 RICH MORIN ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, BEHIND THE BADGE 15 (2017).
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does little to shield government officials from discovery and trial in filed
cases.  If the burdens of discovery and trial do in fact discourage potential job
applicants and chill officers’ behavior, qualified immunity doctrine can do
little in practice to counteract these effects.
There would likely be disagreement among the Justices—and there
would certainly be disagreement among the public—about what would con-
stitute optimal deterrence of law enforcement officers.  But regardless of how
“unflinching” one believes an officer should be in the “discharge of their
duties,”103 the threat of being sued appears to play little role in the decisions
of job applicants and officers on the street.  And qualified immunity doctrine
could do little to mitigate whatever concerns about liability do exist.
III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY RENDERS THE CONSTITUTION HOLLOW
The Supreme Court might alternatively decide to eliminate or limit qual-
ified immunity doctrine because, in Justice Sotomayor’s words, it “renders
the protections” of the Constitution “hollow.”104  Although Justice
Sotomayor raised this concern regarding one case in particular, Mullenix v.
Luna, it is a concern that could well be raised about the Court’s qualified
immunity jurisprudence more generally.  Although qualified immunity is the
reason few Section 1983 cases against law enforcement are dismissed, the
Court’s qualified immunity decisions have nevertheless made it increasingly
difficult for plaintiffs to show that defendants have violated clearly estab-
lished law, and increasingly easy for courts to avoid defining the contours of
constitutional rights.
When qualified immunity was first announced by the Supreme Court in
1967, it was described as a good faith defense from liability.  For the next
fifteen years, defendants seeking immunity were required to show both that
their conduct was objectively reasonable and that they had a “good faith”
belief that their conduct was proper.105  But, in 1982, the Court eliminated
the subjective prong of the defense, entitling a defendant to qualified immu-
nity so long as he did not violate “law [that] was clearly established at the
time an action occurred.”106
The Court’s definition of “clearly established” law has narrowed signifi-
cantly over the past thirty-five years.  Although the Court once held that a
plaintiff could defeat qualified immunity by showing an obvious constitu-
tional violation,107 the Court’s subsequent decisions have required that plain-
tiffs point to “controlling authority in their jurisdiction” or a “consensus of
cases of persuasive authority.”108  In its most recent decisions, the Court has
only been willing to assume arguendo that circuit precedent or a consensus
103 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (citation omitted).
104 Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 316 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
105 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815–16.
106 Id. at 818.
107 See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
108 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999).
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of cases can clearly establish the law—suggesting that Supreme Court prece-
dent is the only surefire way to clearly establish the law.109
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity decisions require
that the prior precedent clearly establishing the law have facts exceedingly
similar to those in the instant case.  Although the Court has repeatedly
assured plaintiffs that it “ ‘do[es] not require a case directly on point’ for a
right to be clearly established,” it has also repeatedly cautioned that “ ‘clearly
established law’ should not be defined ‘at a high level of generality.’”110
Indeed, the Court has stated—and regularly restated—that government offi-
cials violate clearly established law only when “‘[t]he contours of [a] right
[are] sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would [have under-
stood] that what he is doing violates that right.’”111  In recent years, the
Court has reversed several lower court denials of qualified immunity because
the lower court “misunderstood the ‘clearly established’ analysis” and “failed
to identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances as [the
defendant] was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment.”112
The challenge of identifying clearly established law is heightened fur-
ther by the Court’s decision in Pearson v. Callahan, which allows courts to
grant qualified immunity without ruling on the underlying constitutional vio-
lation.113  Courts considering qualified immunity motions are faced with two
questions—whether a defendant has violated the Constitution, and whether
the constitutional right was clearly established.  In 2001, the Supreme Court
instructed lower courts deciding qualified immunity motions to answer both
questions: The Court reasoned that requiring lower courts to rule on the
constitutionality of a defendant’s behavior would allow “the law’s elaboration
from case to case . . . .  The law might be deprived of this explanation were a
court simply to skip ahead to the question whether the law clearly established
that the officer’s conduct was unlawful in the circumstances of the case.”114
In 2009, in Pearson v. Callahan, the Court reversed itself and held that lower
courts could grant qualified immunity without first ruling on the constitu-
tionality of a defendant’s behavior.115
Taken together, the Court’s qualified immunity decisions have created a
vicious cycle.  The Supreme Court has instructed lower courts that they must
109 See Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100 MINN.
L. REV. HEADNOTES 62, 70–71 (2016) (describing this shift in the Supreme Court’s quali-
fied immunity decisions in recent years).
110 White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551–52 (2017) (alteration in original) (first quoting
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 306, 308 (2015); and then quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563
U.S. 731, 742 (2011)).
111 Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Ander-
son v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
112 White, 137 S. Ct. at 552; see also supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text (describing
the frequency with which the Supreme Court grants certiorari and reverses qualified
immunity denials and the Court’s criticisms of these lower court opinions).
113 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
114 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
115 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 223–24.
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grant qualified immunity unless they can find a prior Supreme Court deci-
sion, binding precedent, or consensus of cases in which “an officer acting
under similar circumstances”116 has been found to have violated the Consti-
tution.  Yet the Court has also advised lower courts that they can grant quali-
fied immunity without ruling on plaintiffs’ underlying constitutional
claims—reducing the frequency with which lower courts announce clearly
established law.117  And the Supreme Court is among the worst offenders on
this score; although the Supreme Court has suggested in recent decisions
that it may be the only body that can clearly establish the law for qualified
immunity purposes,118 it repeatedly grants qualified immunity without ruling
on the underlying constitutional claim.119  This precise illogic is on full dis-
play in Mullenix v. Luna, the Supreme Court decision that provoked Justice
Sotomayor’s expression of concern about the damage qualified immunity
does to the Constitution.
In Mullenix, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and held that
qualified immunity protected Texas Department of Public Safety Officer
Mullenix from liability for killing Israel Leija, Jr., as he was fleeing arrest for
violating misdemeanor probation.120  Officer Mullenix “fired six rounds in
the dark at a car traveling 85 miles per hour . . . without any training in that
tactic, against the wait order of his superior officer, and less than a second
before the car hit spike strips deployed to stop it.”121  Mullenix’s first words
to his supervisor after the shooting were, “How’s that for proactive?”—appar-
ently referring to an earlier conversation in which the supervisor “suggested
that [Mullenix] was not enterprising enough.”122  The district court denied
Mullenix’s summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed.  But, in a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held
that the trooper did not violate clearly established law.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court reviewed three of its prior deci-
sions involving law enforcement officers who shot fleeing suspects,123 one of
which granted the officer qualified immunity without ruling on the underly-
ing constitutional claim.124  The Court then described these cases as creating
a “hazy legal backdrop against which Mullenix acted.”125  Finally, the Court
116 White, 137 S. Ct. at 552.
117 See Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1, 37 (2015) (comparing several studies that examine qualified immunity decisions
before and after Saucier and Pearson, and finding that courts after Pearson decide constitu-
tional questions less frequently and are also less likely to find constitutional violations when
granting qualified immunity).
118 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
119 See Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: Time to Change the Message, 93 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1887 (2018) (describing several of these cases).
120 Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 312 (2015) (per curiam).
121 Id. at 313 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 316 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
123 Id. at 309–11 (opinion of the Court).
124 See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004).
125 Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 309.
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relied on this uncertainty to grant qualified immunity, but did not decide
whether Mullenix violated the Constitution—and so did not clear the haze.
Mullenix’s remark to his supervisor played no role in the analysis, as “an
officer’s actual intentions are irrelevant” to the qualified immunity analy-
sis.126  Justice Sotomayor, dissenting, wrote that the Court’s decision “sanc-
tion[s] a ‘shoot first, think later’ approach to policing” and thereby “renders
the protections of the Fourth Amendment hollow.”127
Concerns that the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence renders the
Constitution hollow are even more acute for constitutional claims involving
new technologies and techniques.  Despite the Court’s discussion of the
“hazy legal backdrop” in Mullenix, there are decades of decisions analyzing
when shooting a fleeing suspect constitutes excessive force.128  There are
comparatively fewer cases assessing the constitutional rights of citizens to
record the police or defining when Taser use constitutes excessive force.129
By narrowly defining “clearly established law” and allowing courts to grant
qualified immunity without ruling on the underlying constitutional claim,
the Supreme Court leaves important questions about the scope of constitu-
tional rights “needlessly floundering in the lower courts,” as Karen Blum has
written, possibly never to be clarified.130  And even when there is some clarifi-
126 Id. at 316 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg recently raised concerns
about the failure to consider evidence of officer intent in another setting—probable cause
determinations.  The failure to do so, she wrote, “sets the balance too heavily in favor of
police unaccountability to the detriment of Fourth Amendment protection.”  District of
Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 594 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment in
part).
127 Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 316 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  Justice Sotomayor, joined by
Justice Ginsburg, raised similar concerns in her dissent in Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148
(2018).  In that case, Officer Kisela shot the plaintiff when she was holding a kitchen knife
by her side and speaking with her roommate in a “composed and content” manner. Id. at
1155.  Two other officers on the scene held their fire, but Kisela shot Hughes four times
without a prior warning. Id.  Justice Sotomayor found that Kisela violated the Fourth
Amendment and that prior precedent clearly established the unconstitutionality of his con-
duct. Id. at 1157–58, 1161.  She further wrote that the Court’s trend of summarily revers-
ing denials of qualified immunity “transforms the doctrine into an absolute shield for law
enforcement officers, gutting the deterrent effect of the Fourth Amendment,” and that the
Court’s decision in Kisela “sends an alarming signal to law enforcement officers . . . that
they can shoot first and think later.” Id. at 1162.
128 See, e.g., Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 309–11 (describing some of these cases).
129 For discussions of the doctrinal confusion in these areas, see Matthew Slaughter,
First Amendment Right to Record Police: When Clearly Established Law Is Not Clear Enough, 49 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 101 (2015); Bailey Jennifer Woolfstead, Don’t Tase Me Bro: A Lack of
Jurisdictional Consensus Across Circuit Lines, 29 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 285 (2012).
130 Blum, supra note 119, at 1895.  Blum describes the slow road to constitutional clarity
in the circuits regarding the existence of a First Amendment right to record the police. Id.
But there are still five circuits by Blum’s count that have not announced such a right.  And
new technologies may create even more complex constitutional questions than those
involved in recording the police. See, e.g., Woolfstead, supra note 129 (describing lack of
agreement among courts about what level of force Tasers constitute and the differences
between using Tasers in “dart mode” and “drive-stun” mode).
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cation about the existence and scope of novel constitutional rights, qualified
immunity may still be granted if the facts of those prior cases are not suffi-
ciently similar to the case at hand.
The Supreme Court has described qualified immunity doctrine as bal-
ancing “two important interests—the need to hold public officials accounta-
ble when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials
from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties
reasonably.”131  By simultaneously allowing courts to decide qualified immu-
nity motions without reaching the underlying constitutional questions and
requiring plaintiffs to produce circuit or Supreme Court opinions finding
constitutional violations in cases with nearly identical facts, and by ignoring
available evidence of officers’ culpable intent, the Court perpetuates uncer-
tainty about the contours of the Constitution and sends the message to
officers that they may be shielded from damages liability even when they act
in bad faith.
These criticisms of qualified immunity may appear to sit in some tension
with my finding that filed cases are rarely dismissed on qualified immunity
grounds.  If qualified immunity is the reason that less than four percent of
filed cases are dismissed, can it render the protections of the Constitution
hollow?  Unfortunately, the answer is yes.  Qualified immunity doctrine
imperils government accountability in several ways, even as it is the reason
few cases are dismissed.  First, as Justice Sotomayor has explained in Mullenix
and Kisela v. Hughes, the Supreme Court’s flurry of recent decisions granting
qualified immunity—even to officers who have acted unreasonably or in bad
faith—suggest to officers that they can act with impunity.132  As Justice
Sotomayor has written, an opinion like Kisela “tells officers that they can
shoot first and think later, and it tells the public that palpably unreasonable
conduct will go unpunished.”133  The Supreme Court’s decisions can send
this message to police and the public regardless of how many decisions are
dismissed on qualified immunity grounds in the lower courts.
Second, qualified immunity doctrine may discourage people from bring-
ing cases when their constitutional rights are violated.134  The Supreme
Court’s decisions send the message to plaintiffs’ attorneys that even Section
1983 cases with egregious facts run the risk of dismissal on qualified immu-
nity grounds, and encourage defense counsel to raise qualified immunity at
every turn and immediately appeal district court decisions denying their
motions.135  These dynamics likely increase the cost, complexity, and delay
associated with litigating Section 1983 cases, and these increased risks and
costs may discourage attorneys from taking cases involving novel constitu-
131 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
132 See supra note 127 and accompanying text (describing Justice Sotomayor’s
concerns).
133 Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
134 For discussion of this possibility, as well as the possibility that qualified immunity
doctrine causes plaintiffs not to file insubstantial cases, see infra Section IV.C.
135 For further discussion of this possibility, see id. See also Schwartz, supra note 40.
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tional claims and cases that involve clear constitutional violations but low
damages.136  Qualified immunity can play this role in constitutional litigation
while still being the reason few filed cases are dismissed.
Third, decisions allowing courts to grant qualified immunity without rul-
ing on the underlying constitutional claims may compromise police depart-
ments’ policies and trainings.  Many law enforcement agencies’ policies and
trainings hew closely to Supreme Court and circuit decisions.137  When the
Supreme Court and circuit courts issue opinions announcing new constitu-
tional rights—or clarifying that rights do not exist—law enforcement agen-
cies modify their policies and trainings to conform to those opinions.138  But
when the Supreme Court suggests that only its decisions can clearly establish
136 See infra Section IV.C.
137 Ingrid Eagly and I have studied Lexipol LLC, a private company that provides stan-
dardized policies and trainings to 3000 law enforcement agencies in thirty-five states across
the country, including 95% of all California law enforcement agencies. See Ingrid V. Eagly
& Joanna C. Schwartz, Lexipol: The Privatization of Police Policymaking, 96 TEX. L. REV. 891
(2018).  Each Lexipol policy is designated as based on “federal law,” “state law,” “best prac-
tices,” or is “discretionary.”  Lexipol representatives warn their subscribers not to change
those policies based on federal and state law.  Jurisdictions understand this message—one
deputy chief explained that policies designated as “best practices” or “discretionary” are
viewed as “optional,” but those that are the “law” are required.  Of course, jurisdictions vary
in the degree to which they rely on court decisions when crafting their policies and train-
ings, but we have found that the dominant private police policymaker relies heavily on
court opinions. See also infra note 139.
138 See, e.g., POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE 18
(2016) (explaining that after the Fourth Circuit held that using a Taser repeatedly in drive-
stun mode was unconstitutional, “several agencies in jurisdictions covered by the Fourth
Circuit ruling amended their use-of-force and ECW [Electronic Control Weapons] poli-
cies” in response to the decision); Lawrence Rosenthal, Seven Theses in Grudging Defense of
the Exclusionary Rule, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 525, 543 (2013) (“After the Court prohibited
random stops of motorists to check their licenses and registration in Delaware v. Prouse, the
District of Columbia Police Department almost immediately overhauled its policies to com-
ply with the new ruling.  More recently, after the Court held that the installation and subse-
quent use of a GPS device to monitor a vehicle’s movements was a ‘search’ within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment in United States v. Jones, the FBI’s general counsel
reported that the decision caused the agency to turn off nearly 3,000 monitoring
devices.”); David Alan Sklansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567
(2008) (observing that California law enforcement agencies stopped training their officers
not to conduct warrantless searches of trash—a requirement of California constitutional
law—after the United States Supreme Court rejected this prohibition); Charles D. Weis-
selberg, In the Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1121 (2001) (examining how
California law enforcement agencies trained officers to comply with a Supreme Court deci-
sion reaffirming Miranda); Patrick Healy, LAPD Commission Adds to Guidelines for Review of
Police Use of Force, NBC L.A. (Feb. 19, 2014), https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/
LAPD-Commission-Adds-to-Guidelines-for-Review-of-Police-Use-of-Force-246094151.html
(reporting that a decision by the California Supreme Court that “tactical conduct and deci-
sions preceding the use of deadly force are relevant considerations under California law in
determining whether the use of deadly force gives rise to negligence liability” caused the
Los Angeles Police Commission to change the ways in which it evaluates whether force
used by its officers was proper).
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the law, and then repeatedly grants qualified immunity without ruling on the
underlying constitutional questions, law enforcement agencies have little in
the way of guidance about how to craft their policies.
For example, the Supreme Court has spent countless hours and an out-
sized portion of its docket in recent years deciding whether officers who use
deadly force are entitled to qualified immunity, but these opinions offer vir-
tually no guidance to law enforcement agencies about what constitutes exces-
sive force.  Indeed, the North Star for many departments’ use of force
policies is Graham v. Connor, a Supreme Court decision that is almost thirty
years old and itself provides limited guidance to law enforcement agencies
regarding what constitutes excessive force.139
If qualified immunity doctrine effectively shielded government officials
from burdens associated with litigation in insubstantial cases, one might jus-
tify these impositions on government accountability as a necessary evil.  But
the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence threatens to undermine gov-
ernment accountability in each of these ways without meaningfully achieving
its goals of shielding government defendants from financial exposure and
shielding officials from litigation burdens when they act reasonably.  The fail-
ure of qualified immunity to achieve its intended policy goals makes its nega-
tive impact on government accountability indefensible.
IV. ALTERNATIVE DEFENSES OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY ARE UNPERSUASIVE
The Supreme Court’s qualified immunity doctrine is ungrounded in his-
tory, unnecessary or ill-suited to serve its intended policy goals, and counter-
productive to interests in holding government wrongdoers responsible when
they have violated the law.  The Court has said that evidence undermining its
justifications for qualified immunity would be reason to revisit the sensibility
of the defense.140  Yet the Justices might, instead, advance alternative justifi-
cations for qualified immunity.  Commentators have offered three alternative
rationales for qualified immunity that the Court might conceivably adopt.
139 See Eagly & Schwartz, supra note 137; see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386
(1989).  Some progressive agencies are adopting policies and trainings that offer more
specific guidance on use of force than does Graham, but the founder of Lexipol LLC,
which writes police policies for 3000 agencies nationwide, argues that use of force policies
should not go beyond the guidance offered by the Supreme Court in Graham, writing:
Several years ago, our forefathers decided that there would be nine of the
finest legal minds in the country who would interpret the law of the land.  For
almost 30 years, law enforcement has learned to function under the guidance of
the Supreme Court’s “objective reasonableness” standard.  What would happen if
each of the 18,000+ law enforcement agencies in the United States formulated
their own standard “beyond” Graham?
Eagly & Schwartz, supra note 137, at 928 (quoting Bruce D. Praet, National Consensus Policy
on Use of Force Should Not Trigger Changes to Agency Policies, LEXIPOL (Jan. 25, 2017), http://
www.lexipol.com/news/use-caution-when-changing-use-of-force-policy-language/).
140 See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 n.2 (1987) (observing that evidence
undermining its assumptions about constitutional litigation might “justify reconsideration
of the balance struck” by its qualified immunity jurisprudence).
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The first is that qualified immunity doctrine shields government budgets
from excess liability and thereby encourages government officials to instruct
their officers vigorously to enforce the law.  The second is that qualified
immunity encourages development of constitutional law because it allows
courts to announce new constitutional rights without imposing damages lia-
bility on the officials whose conduct was at issue in the case.  The third is that
qualified immunity protects government defendants from insubstantial suits
by discouraging attorneys from filing such cases.  In this Part, I will explain
why the Court would be ill-advised to adopt any of these rationales for quali-
fied immunity.
A. Qualified Immunity Cannot Be Justified as a Protection
for Government Budgets
Although individual officers virtually never personally satisfy settlements
and judgments entered against them, qualified immunity has been described
as a financial protection for local governments that indemnify their
officers.141  Government officials, concerned about the costs of damages
awards, might encourage inaction by their officers to reduce liability costs.142
If so, qualified immunity would arguably allow government officials to make
decisions without undue concern about the financial impact of those deci-
sions.  In order for qualified immunity to be justified on these grounds, one
must assume that government officials would encourage inaction by their
employees in response to fears of financial liability, and that qualified immu-
nity lessens those concerns and allows government officials instead to
encourage vigorous enforcement of the law.
There are three reasons for skepticism about this rationale for qualified
immunity.  First, this rationale relies on unfounded assumptions about the
flow of information about lawsuits within government bureaucracies.  In
order for lawsuit payouts to influence government officials’ management of
their officers, officials would need enough information about those law-
suits—including the officers named, the underlying facts, and the amount
paid—to make policy and supervision decisions aimed at reducing the costs
of those types of cases in the future.  My research suggests that most law
141 See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts, Consti-
tutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 856 (2007) (noting that widespread
indemnification undermines “the stated justification for qualified immunity,” but “[w]hen
qualified immunity is viewed from the standpoint of a public employer—the party that
bears the economic burden of liability—this doctrine has a compelling justification”).
142 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207,
245–46 (2013) (“Civil-rights judgments and the accompanying awards of attorneys’ fees are
on-budget costs.  At least for states and localities . . . increased on-budget costs mean
higher taxes or cuts in other expenditures.  The political penalties for either choice can be
severe.  There is this additional reason to think, therefore, that while erroneous govern-
ment action and erroneous government inaction may be equally costly to society as a
whole, the former is more likely to trigger on-budget liability and thus to affect and distort
government behavior.”).
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enforcement agencies do not collect this type of information about lawsuits
brought against their officers.143  Indeed, in most departments, there
appears to be minimal effort to track or analyze the nature of claims filed
against their officers or the evidence generated during discovery in those
cases.144  Many large police departments do not even have ready access to
information about the amount paid to satisfy settlements and judgments
against them and their officers.145
The fact that most law enforcement agencies do not systematically
gather and analyze information from damages actions brought against them
does not mean that these suits can never impact policies and practices.  Law-
suits that receive press coverage may capture the attention of police chiefs
and other policy makers, and may inspire departments to institute changes to
prevent future similar cases.146  Information revealed during discovery and
trial—particularly if it is disclosed to the public—can create political pressure
on departments to take action.147  Information generated during litigation
can also be used to support future cases seeking systemic reform.148  Plain-
tiffs sometimes negotiate settlements in damages actions that require reforms
to police policies and trainings.149  And police misconduct attorneys have
told me that sustained litigation pressure on particular departments some-
143 See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits
in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023 (2010).
144 See id.
145 See Schwartz, supra note 46, at 903 (reporting that fifty-eight of the seventy largest
law enforcement agencies to which I submitted public records requests did not have infor-
mation about payouts in lawsuits brought against their agencies and officers and so had to
seek the information from other municipal departments).
146 See Joanna C. Schwartz, What Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 841, 844
(2012) (describing this possibility).  For example, large litigation payouts and several high-
profile shootings led the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors to order an indepen-
dent commission to review the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department in 1992. See
JAMES G. KOLTS ET AL., LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT 1 (1992) (reporting
that the independent commission was prompted by “[a]n increase over the past years in
the number of officer-involved shootings,” “[f]our controversial shootings of minorities by
LASD deputies in August 1991,” and the fact that “Los Angeles County . . . paid $32 million
in claims arising from the operations of the LASD over the past four years”).  Twenty years
later, another independent commission investigated the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Depart-
ment’s handling of the L.A. County Jail, prompted in part, again, by high profile litigation
against the Department. See REPORT OF THE CITIZENS’ COMMISSION ON JAIL VIOLENCE 42,
185 (2012).
147 See Joanna C. Schwartz, Introspection Through Litigation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1055,
1057 n.7 (2015) (describing studies showing lawsuits have revealed information that has
advanced regulatory efforts in a number of areas).
148 For two examples of complaints that use prior lawsuits to demonstrate a pattern or
practice of misconduct, see Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, An v. City of
New York, 16-cv-05381 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2017); Third Amended Complaint for Damages,
Starr v. County of Los Angeles, 08-cv-00508 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2008).
149 See, e.g., Alphonse A. Gerhardstein, Making a Buck While Making a Difference, 21
MICH. J. RACE & L. 251, 254–57 (2016) (describing multiple cases that have led to
reforms).
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times yields positive results.150  But if law enforcement agencies do not keep
track of or analyze basic information about the lawsuits filed and resolved
against their officers, they cannot make policy and supervision decisions
informed by most cases brought against them.
Second, this rationale for qualified immunity assumes that, absent quali-
fied immunity, governments and police departments would feel the costs of
lawsuit payouts so acutely that officials would promote timidity on the part of
their officers as a way to reduce lawsuit costs in the future.  Yet lawsuit
payouts have no financial consequences for the majority of large law enforce-
ment agencies across the country.  In a prior study, I gathered information
about lawsuit budgeting and payment arrangements in sixty-two of the sev-
enty jurisdictions with the largest law enforcement agencies and in jurisdic-
tions with thirty-eight smaller agencies.151  At least 60% of the largest
agencies and 75% of the smaller self-insured agencies in my study feel no
financial consequences when lawsuit costs increase and no financial benefits
when lawsuit costs decline.152  There may well be political pressures associ-
ated with these payouts.153  But those political pressures will not reliably
translate into policy and supervision decisions if the agency in question does
not have enough information about trends in the lawsuits brought against it
to know how to reduce those costs.
It is less certain what impact lawsuits have on the law enforcement agen-
cies that do suffer some financial consequences of payouts.  There are rea-
sons to believe that payouts may influence policies and practices in these
departments to some degree.  But no officials I interviewed during the course
of my study reported that their police department’s financial responsibility
for payouts negatively affected their policy or training decisions, or otherwise
encouraged timidity.154  In order to justify qualified immunity as a means of
encouraging vigorous government decisionmaking, it would be necessary to
show both that lawsuit payouts influence government policy and supervision
decisions, and also that lawsuit payouts cause officials to make policy and
supervision decisions that favor inaction.  Available evidence offers no reason
to believe that is the case.
A final reason for skepticism about this rationale for qualified immunity
is that it relies on the assumption that qualified immunity doctrine signifi-
150 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with N.D. Ohio Attorney D (on file with author)
(reporting that his firm’s litigation against the Cleveland Police Department caused the
Department to issue a policy prohibiting officers from shooting at moving vehicles); Tele-
phone Interview with M.D. Fla. Attorney G (on file with author) (describing reforms to the
Florida jail system and the Jacksonville fire department resulting from litigation); Tele-
phone Interview with E.D. Pa. Attorney G (on file with author) (describing political pres-
sures resulting from a series of damages actions that contributed to a mayor’s failure to get
reelected).
151 See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police
Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1148 (2016).
152 See id. at 1203.
153 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
154 See Schwartz, supra note 151, at 1201.
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cantly reduces liability costs.  My research makes clear that very few lawsuits
are dismissed because of qualified immunity.155  Moreover, qualified immu-
nity may in fact increase the costs of litigating constitutional cases.  In my
docket dataset, defendants raised qualified immunity in 154 motions to dis-
miss—each of which needed to be briefed and argued by the parties.  Seven
(4.5%) of those motions resulted in the dismissal of plaintiffs’ cases.  In those
seven cases, qualified immunity spared defendants money associated with fur-
ther litigation—which might have included discovery, summary judgment,
and trial.  But the parties spent money briefing and arguing qualified immu-
nity in the other 147 motions without a corresponding benefit.  Defendants
raised qualified immunity in 283 summary judgment motions, twenty-seven
of which (9.5%) resulted in dismissal.  In these twenty-seven cases, the litiga-
tion cost savings would have been modest—discovery was already complete,
and the cost of summary judgment practice may in some instances exceed
the cost of going to trial.156  In the other 256 (90.5%) cases, the money and
time spent to brief and argue qualified immunity did not spare the parties
the costs of trial.
The costs of interlocutory appeals are even more difficult to justify.  As
Judge James Gwin of the Northern District of Ohio recently explained,
In the typical case, allowing interlocutory appeals actually increases the bur-
den and expense of litigation both for government officers and for plain-
tiffs . . . because an interlocutory appeal adds another round of substantive
briefing for both parties, potentially oral argument before an appellate
panel, and usually more than twelve months of delay while waiting for an
appellate decision.  All of this happens in place of a trial that (1) could have
finished in less than a week, and (2) will often be conducted anyway after the
interlocutory appeal.157
Given this evidence, there is no basis to conclude that qualified immunity
reduces the costs of Section 1983 litigation, and reason to believe it actually
increases costs in some cases.
Of course, qualified immunity grants may spare defendants not only the
costs of litigation but also the costs of large settlements and jury verdicts.  It is
possible that there would have been significant payouts in the thirty-eight
cases that were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds in my docket
dataset.158  But it is also possible that these cases would have been dismissed
on other grounds at the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stages, or
155 See Schwartz, supra note 40, at 60.
156 See id. at 61 (observing that most trials in my dataset lasted just a few days); see also
Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of Facts in
Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 100 (1997) (observing that, when considering
the efficiencies of qualified immunity, “the costs eliminated by resolving the case prior to
trial must be compared to the costs of trying the case” and “the pretrial litigation costs
caused by the invoking of the immunity defense may cancel out the trial costs saved by that
defense”).
157 Wheatt v. City of East Cleveland, No. 1:17-CV-377, 2017 WL 6031816, at *4 (N.D.
Ohio Dec. 6, 2017).
158 See Schwartz, supra note 40.
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ended in defense verdicts.159  Indeed, in the two districts in my study with the
most qualified immunity dismissals—the Southern District of Texas and the
Middle District of Florida—juries appear especially inhospitable to plain-
tiffs.160  And even if these thirty-eight cases had resulted in large verdicts or
settlements, those payments would have been spread across thirty-two differ-
ent jurisdictions.161
Qualified immunity might also shift the dynamics of civil rights litigation
in other ways that shield government coffers—the doctrine might discourage
plaintiffs from filing some cases, encourage plaintiffs to settle cases they oth-
erwise would have brought to trial, or reduce cases’ settlement value.162  But
even if eliminating qualified immunity increased filings, caused more cases to
go to trial, and increased settlement amounts to some degree, it does not
follow that these shifts would so imperil government budgets that qualified
immunity is necessary to safeguard robust government policymaking.  Law-
suit payouts are a miniscule portion of most local government budgets and
would remain so even if they increased significantly.163  Of course, local gov-
ernments are perpetually strapped for cash, and every dollar counts.  But
especially given the limited information agencies have about lawsuits brought
against them and the limited impact of lawsuit payouts on most law enforce-
ment agencies’ budgets, the possibility that qualified immunity might shield
local governments from some additional liability costs is insufficient reason
to preserve the doctrine.
159 Seventy-seven cases in my study ended in jury verdicts; sixty-seven were defense ver-
dicts, three were split verdicts, and seven were plaintiffs’ verdicts. See id. at 46.  There were
another five cases that resulted in plaintiffs’ verdicts or split verdicts but were settled after
trial: In the Southern District of Texas there were two additional plaintiffs’ verdicts; in the
Middle District of Florida there was one additional plaintiff’s verdict; in the Northern Dis-
trict of California there was one additional plaintiff’s verdict; and in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania there was one additional split verdict.  Accordingly, all in all, there were sixty-
seven defense verdicts, four split verdicts, and eleven plaintiffs’ verdicts.
160 Of the twenty-two cases that went to verdict in these two districts, just three were
plaintiffs’ verdicts.
161 Five qualified immunity dismissals in my dataset were in cases brought against the
Houston Police Department, two were in cases brought against the San Francisco Police
Department, and two were in cases brought against the Brevard Sheriff’s Department.  The
remaining twenty-nine cases were brought against twenty-nine jurisdictions across the five
districts.
162 See Schwartz, supra note 40; see also infra Section IV.C.
163 See Schwartz, supra note 151, at 1224–449 (finding that, among fifty-three of the
largest local governments in the country, payments in lawsuits against law enforcement
amounted to 0.15% of government budgets).  Note, also, that lawsuits against law enforce-
ment typically make up a significant portion of local government liability costs. See id. at
1161 n.58.
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B. Qualified Immunity Cannot Be Justified as a Tool to
Expand Constitutional Rights
Qualified immunity has long been defended on the ground that it
encourages constitutional innovation by courts.164  Qualified immunity doc-
trine allows a court to announce a new constitutional right (or expand the
contours of an existing one), but shield the defendant in the case from dam-
ages liability.  As a result, “[j]udges contemplating an affirmation of constitu-
tional rights need not worry about the financial fallout.”165  In a world
without qualified immunity, John Jeffries argues: “[E]very extension of con-
stitutional rights, whether revolutionary or evolutionary, would trigger
money damages.  In some circumstances, that prospect might not matter.  In
others, it surely would.  The impact of inhibiting constitutional innovation in
this way is impossible to quantify, but I think it would prove deleterious.”166
Jeffries is right—it is impossible to quantify the impact eliminating qualified
immunity would have on the development of constitutional rights.  Even
accepting that qualified immunity could be used by courts to spur constitu-
tional innovation, though, this possible benefit should not save qualified
immunity doctrine from the chopping block.
As a preliminary matter, qualified immunity does not currently appear
to encourage very much in the way of constitutional innovation.  To the
extent courts use qualified immunity to shield government defendants from
liability while expanding constitutional rights moving forward, they need to
decide qualified immunity motions and appeals in a particular way—they
must find a constitutional violation and then grant qualified immunity on the
ground that the right was not clearly established.167  But several studies of
circuit court decisions show that qualified immunity motions are rarely
164 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87,
99–100 (1999) (“Qualified immunity reduces government’s incentives to avoid constitu-
tional violations.  At the same time, it allows courts to embrace innovation without the
potentially paralyzing cost of full remediation for past practice.”); see also Richard H. Fal-
lon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions About Officer Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 480
(2011) (“In the absence of official immunity, even some currently well-established constitu-
tional rights and authorizations to sue to enforce them would likely shrink, and sometimes
appropriately so.”).
165 Jeffries, supra note 142, at 247.
166 Id. at 248. See also Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 857, 915 (1999) (If Section 1983 were expanded and qualified immunity
were eliminated, “who could doubt that the effect would be a wholesale rewriting of consti-
tutional rights?  While it is impossible to predict just how various rights would be transfig-
ured, drastically increasing the cost of rights would surely result in some curtailment.”).
167 Although the Supreme Court once required lower courts to take both of these steps
when deciding qualified immunity motions as a means of facilitating the development of
constitutional law, it held in 2009 that lower courts can grant qualified immunity without
ruling on the underlying constitutional claim. See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying
text (discussing this shift).
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decided in this manner.168  The Supreme Court also seems uninterested in
constitutional innovation through qualified immunity—since its 2009 deci-
sion in Pearson, it has found a constitutional violation but granted qualified
immunity just two times.169  Indeed, courts are far more likely to grant quali-
fied immunity motions without ruling on the underlying constitutional
claim—a practice that increases constitutional stagnation, not innovation.170
The fact that courts infrequently find constitutional violations but grant
qualified immunity does not foreclose the possibility that they are dramati-
cally innovating on the rare occasions that they do.  But, in fact, these deci-
sions offer little in the way of constitutional innovation.  In their study of 844
circuit court qualified immunity opinions decided over a three-year period—
encompassing 1460 separate claims—Aaron Nielson and Christopher Walker
identified fifty-two claims in which circuit courts found one or more constitu-
tional violations but granted qualified immunity.171  Nielson and Walker
kindly shared with me a list of the forty-three cases in which these claims were
adjudicated.  In an Appendix, I have listed these cases and their holdings.172
I would characterize none as dramatically expanding the law.  Four of the
decisions did not develop the law at all: in these cases, the circuit courts
found that there was clearly established law holding defendants’ conduct was
unconstitutional, but granted defendants qualified immunity because the
opinions clearly establishing the law were published after defendants
engaged in their unconstitutional conduct.173  The rest offer what could be
described as modest or incremental developments of the law, applying well-
established constitutional principles to slightly different factual scenarios.174
168 Nielson & Walker, supra note 117, at 37 (collecting studies that show circuit courts,
post-Pearson found constitutional violations but granted qualified immunity in 2.5–7.9% of
decisions).  Courts during the Saucier period more often found constitutional violations
but granted qualified immunity, although such decisions were still relatively infrequent.
Id. (collecting studies that show circuit courts, post-Saucier, found constitutional violations
but granted qualified immunity in 6.5%–13.9% of decisions).
169 See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014) (finding that a public employee’s firing
violated the First Amendment, but granting qualified immunity because the right was not
clearly established); Safford v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 379 (2009) (finding that the strip
search of a middle school student violates the Fourth Amendment, but granting qualified
immunity because the right was not clearly established).
170 Nielson & Walker, supra note 117, at 34 (collecting studies that show circuit courts
post-Pearson granted qualified immunity without ruling on the underlying constitutional
claim in 18.9%–26.7% of claims).
171 See Nielson & Walker, supra note 43, at 1882–83.
172 See Appendix infra.
173 See Appendix infra (describing the holdings in Rivers v. Fischer, 390 F. App’x 22 (2d
Cir. 2010); Scott v. Fischer, 616 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2010); Schwenk v. County of Alameda, 364 F.
App’x 336 (9th Cir. 2010); Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 2009)).
174 See Appendix infra; see also, e.g., Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: Further Develop-
ments in the Post-Pearson Era, 27 TOURO L. REV. 243, 255–59 (2011) (describing several
additional cases in which courts have found constitutional violations but granted qualified
immunity).
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Moreover, there is no reason to believe that qualified immunity’s shield
from damages liability is what motivates courts’ decisions to announce consti-
tutional violations in these cases.  Available evidence of indemnification and
budgeting practices suggest that courts should not be overly concerned about
damages awards against individual officers and agencies.  Even if judges are
unaware of these budgeting and indemnification dynamics, they are unlikely
to face many cases in which there is such “massive financial liability” that it
would cause a court to “constrain the definition of constitutional rights.”175
And even if an interest in shielding defendants from liability does sometimes
encourage courts to decide constitutional questions while granting qualified
immunity, other times courts issuing these decisions are, likely, simply apply-
ing the law176—concluding that defendants violated plaintiffs’ constitutional
rights but were entitled to qualified immunity because there was no “control-
ling authority in their jurisdiction”177 or a “consensus of cases of persuasive
authority”178 with facts so closely resembling the instant case that “existing
175 Jeffries, supra note 142, at 248.  In support of the constitutional innovation defense
of qualified immunity, Jeffries imagines that if school desegregation cases from Brown to
Swann and beyond were brought as damages class actions, courts would have been con-
cerned that “imposing additional requirements on segregated school districts would trig-
ger massive financial liability” and would have issued more tentative rulings as a result. Id.
But such a case is unlikely to arise today, given the Court’s stringent certification require-
ments for damages class actions. See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426
(2013).  And this type of class action would almost certainly be brought against a munici-
pality, which—unlike individual officers—cannot raise a qualified immunity defense.  Jef-
fries’s concern is more apt, though, in a damages class action challenging state action.
Because the state could not be named in such a case, plaintiffs would name individual state
employees, who would be able to raise qualified immunity as a defense.
176 For research offering varying perspectives regarding the extent to which politics,
ideology, and the law influences judicial decisionmaking see, for example, LEE EPSTEIN,
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETI-
CAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013) (arguing that ideology plays a role
in all judicial decisionmaking and is particularly powerful as one moves up the judicial
hierarchy); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE
JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006) (identifying
differences in the ways that Democrat- and Republican-appointed judges vote when the law
is unclear); Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That
Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L. REV. 1895, 1898
(2009) (arguing that law, precedent, and deliberation are the primary determinants of
judicial decisions); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Judicial Politics and Decisionmaking: A New
Approach, 70 VAND. L. REV. 2051, 2051 (2017) (surveying state and federal judges about
hypothetical cases and finding that “the aggregate effect of political ideology is either non-
existent or amounts to roughly one-quarter of a standard deviation”).  For research sug-
gesting that judges exercise Pearson discretion strategically, see Aaron J. Nielson &
Christopher J. Walker, Strategic Immunity, 66 EMORY L.J. 55 (2016).
177 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999).
178 Id.
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precedent . . . placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate.”179
Perhaps qualified immunity should be understood as encouraging con-
stitutional innovation in a broader sense.  Qualified immunity has been
described as one component in a bundle of substantive laws, remedial doc-
trines, and other rules that courts calibrate to achieve an optimal system of
rights and remedies.180  By this logic, regardless of whether qualified immu-
nity is invoked in a particular case, its existence allows courts to read the
Constitution and other rules more expansively—and its elimination would
cause courts to interpret the Constitution and other rules more narrowly.
Qualified immunity arguably played this equilibrating role in Arizona v. Gant,
a Supreme Court case limiting the circumstances in which an officer can con-
duct a warrantless vehicle search.181  Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
addressed concerns that police officers had long relied on the prior legal
rule, which allowed such searches, by observing in a footnote that “qualified
immunity will shield officers from liability for searches conducted in reasona-
ble reliance on that understanding.”182  We cannot know whether or to what
extent the existence of qualified immunity encouraged the Court to issue this
decision.  It is certainly possible that the Court would not have limited war-
rantless vehicle searches in Arizona v. Gant if qualified immunity did not
exist.
But it is just as easy to find a case in which the Court does not treat
qualified immunity as an equilibrating force.  In Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Supreme
Court held Bivens actions cannot be brought regarding policy decisions
made in time of war or national emergency in part out of concern that such
litigation would result in “inquiry and discovery” about “sensitive functions”
of the executive branch and national-security policy.183  Justice Breyer, dis-
senting, observed that these concerns did not necessitate eliminating a Bivens
remedy for this type of claim because there were already a number of other
rules in place that would shield government officials from undue interfer-
ence, including the scope of the Fourth Amendment, qualified immunity,
plausibility pleading rules, and trial courts’ abilities to limit discovery.  Justice
Breyer concluded:
Given these safeguards against undue interference by the Judiciary in times
of war or national-security emergency, the Court’s abolition, or limitation of,
179 Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
731, 741 (2011)).
180 Fallon, supra note 164, at 480 (explaining his “Equilibration Thesis,” by which quali-
fied immunity, along with other rights, justiciability doctrines, and rules of pleading and
proof combine to achieve “the best overall bundle of rights and correspondingly calibrated
remedies within our constitutional system”); Levinson, supra note 166, at 857–60 (describ-
ing his theory of “remedial equilibration,” by which “rights and remedies are inextricably
intertwined” and courts use restrictions in one area to allow corresponding expansions in
others).
181 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
182 Id. at 349 n.11.
183 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1860–61 (2017).
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Bivens actions goes too far.  If you are cold, put on a sweater, perhaps an
overcoat, perhaps also turn up the heat, but do not set fire to the house.184
Although the equilibration idea makes sense, and the Supreme Court
appeared to use qualified immunity in this manner in Arizona v. Gant, it is far
from clear that the Supreme Court is adept at equilibrating, or that it does so
very often.  Evidence suggests qualified immunity is relatively rarely spurring
innovation in circuit courts as well.185  Qualified immunity doctrine cannot
be justified based on such equivocal evidence of its benefits.
Moreover, to whatever extent qualified immunity spurs constitutional
innovation, it is an unnecessarily blunt tool for this task.  Even John Jeffries,
who believes that “some version of qualified immunity should be the liability
rule for constitutional torts”186 to encourage constitutional innovation, criti-
cizes the current doctrine for being “too technical, too fact-specific, and far
too protective of official misconduct.”187  Specifically, Jeffries believes that
the Court’s requirement that law can only be clearly established with factually
similar cases “has pushed qualified immunity far beyond the reach of any
functional justification for that protection,”188 and that the focus should
instead be on whether an officer’s conduct was “clearly unconstitutional.”189
This is a step in the right direction, but I would go further.
If a goal of qualified immunity is to spur constitutional innovation by
assuring courts that there will be no financial fallout following a finding of
unconstitutionality, there are other ways of achieving this goal.190  The
Supreme Court could limit the circumstances in which constitutional innova-
tions are retroactively enforced.191  Or courts could simply take to heart evi-
dence that individual officers virtually never contribute to settlements and
judgments entered against them.192  Because officers are indemnified, elimi-
nating qualified immunity would not dramatically expand officers’ exposure
to damages liability and should not, therefore, chill constitutional
innovation.
184 Id. at 1884 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
185 See supra note 168 (describing evidence of the frequency with which circuit courts
find constitutional violations but grant qualified immunity); Appendix (illustrating the
modest or incremental nature of circuit courts’ development of the law in these cases).
186 Jeffries, supra note 142, at 249.
187 Id. at 264.
188 Id. at 253.
189 Id. at 264.
190 Accord Fallon, supra note 164, at 480 (recommending reconsideration of the extent
to which qualified immunity doctrine is well-suited or necessary to achieve its intended
goals).
191 See id. at 502–03 (discussing nonretroactivity doctrines as a means of encouraging
expansion of constitutional rights).
192 See supra Section II.A.  Courts can also take note of the fact that law enforcement
agencies infrequently feel the financial consequences of lawsuits, and that lawsuit payouts
are a miniscule part of most jurisdictions’ budgets. See supra Section IV.A.
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C. Qualified Immunity Cannot Be Justified as a Prefiling Filter
When the Supreme Court describes qualified immunity as a shield from
the burdens of litigation in insubstantial cases, it always appears to suggest
that the doctrine will achieve this goal through the quick dismissal of filed
cases.  But some defenders of the doctrine appear to believe that qualified
immunity could achieve this goal by discouraging insubstantial cases from
ever being filed.193  Although my study of 1183 federal dockets makes clear
that qualified immunity ends very few cases, it does not answer what role
qualified immunity plays in case-filing decisions.194  Accordingly, for a future
project exploring the role that qualified immunity plays in the decision to file
suit, I have surveyed attorneys from around the country who entered appear-
ances in these 1183 cases and conducted in-depth interviews with a subset of
these attorneys.195  Based on the docket dataset, the surveys, and the inter-
views, I find three reasons to believe qualified immunity cannot be justified as
a means of filtering out insubstantial cases before filing.196
First, the attorneys I interviewed reported taking into account a number
of different considerations when deciding whether to accept a case, includ-
ing the egregiousness of the facts, the strength of the evidence supporting
the claim, whether a jury would find the plaintiff sympathetic, and the
amount of recoverable damages.  A majority of the attorneys I interviewed
reported that qualified immunity was among their considerations when
selecting a case, but many in this group suggested it did not play a control-
ling role in their decision-making process.  Lawyers did not have the same
views about which factors were the most important to consider, or how they
should be considered together, but my interviews consistently reflected the
multifaceted nature of attorneys’ case-filing decisions.  Accordingly, to the
extent that qualified immunity is playing a role in case selection, it is playing
a role mediated by a number of different concerns.
Second, to the extent that qualified immunity has an impact on case
filing decisions, it is far from clear that the doctrine is filtering out only
insubstantial cases.  The attorneys who reported declining cases because of
qualified immunity reported that the doctrine discourages the filing of cases
concerning constitutional violations that are novel or ill-defined in circuit
and Supreme Court opinions, and cases in which the costs of litigating quali-
fied immunity would be greater than the damages at stake.  One attorney
reported that the challenges associated with litigating qualified immunity dis-
couraged him from bringing Section 1983 cases altogether.  None of these
193 See, e.g., Andrew King, Keep Qualified Immunity . . . For Now, MIMESIS (July 1, 2016),
http://mimesislaw.com/fault-lines/keep-qualified-immunity-for-now/11010 (“Mostly, but
for qualified immunity, it’s a bonanza for plaintiff’s lawyers.”).
194 See generally Schwartz, supra note 40.
195 See Joanna C. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity Selection Effects (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author).
196 Alex Reinert reached similar conclusions when he explored the impact of qualified
immunity doctrine on plaintiffs’ attorneys’ decisions to file Bivens actions. See Alexander
A. Reinert, Does Qualified Immunity Matter?, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 477 (2011).
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responses suggest that qualified immunity is doing a good job of screening
out only the “insubstantial” cases.
Third, a majority of the attorneys I interviewed reported that they rarely
or never decline to bring a case because of qualified immunity.  These attor-
neys are no fans of the doctrine—they believe that it increases the costs and
risks of Section 1983 litigation, and several had had cases dismissed on quali-
fied immunity grounds.  Nevertheless, the attorneys offered several reasons
why the doctrine does not discourage them from filing cases they would oth-
erwise take.  Some explained that the challenges posed by qualified immu-
nity are replicated by other case-screening considerations.  For example,
several attorneys reported that concerns about judges’ and juries’ predisposi-
tions against police misconduct suits cause them to select cases with facts so
egregious that they are not vulnerable to dismissal on qualified immunity.
Others explained that they limit the effects of qualified immunity by includ-
ing state law claims or municipal liability claims—that cannot be dismissed
on qualified immunity grounds—in their cases.  Some attorneys reported
that they are not overly influenced by qualified immunity when selecting
cases because the impact of qualified immunity on any given case is difficult
to predict.  And several attorneys made clear that they will accept a case they
view as important to vindicate plaintiffs’ rights or defend the Constitution,
even if the case is vulnerable to attack on qualified immunity grounds.
Based on this limited sample, I cannot know the extent to which these
attorneys’ views are representative of those held by plaintiffs’ attorneys
around the country.  But none of these observations support the hypothesis
that qualified immunity serves its intended function as a shield against the
burdens of litigation by screening out insubstantial cases before they are
filed.
V. MOVING FORWARD
The Supreme Court created qualified immunity based on a misunder-
standing of common-law defenses in place when Section 1983 became law.
The Court has justified its dramatic expansion of qualified immunity in the
name of policy aims that the doctrine does not actually advance.  The Court’s
qualified immunity jurisprudence hinders government accountability and
inhibits the development of constitutional law.  And alternative justifications
for the doctrine are equally unconvincing.  If the Supreme Court takes this
evidence seriously, they should do away with or dramatically limit qualified
immunity.  And if the Supreme Court refuses to do so, lower courts can
resolve qualified immunity motions in ways that mitigate some of the worst
aspects of the doctrine. 
A. The Supreme Court
If the Supreme Court accepts Justice Thomas’s invitation in Ziglar to
reconsider qualified immunity, takes seriously available evidence demonstrat-
ing that the doctrine neither comports with its historical antecedents nor
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achieves its intended policy goals, and decides to take action, there are sev-
eral possible paths forward.197  The most dramatic course would be to elimi-
nate qualified immunity or conform qualified immunity doctrine to
common-law defenses in existence in 1871, when Section 1983 became law.
If the Court is inclined to take this type of action, stare decisis should not be
an impediment.  Principles of stare decisis counsel against overruling statu-
tory precedent and, instead, leaving modifications of such rules to Con-
gress.198  But Will Baude has observed that the Court does not treat qualified
immunity as a “purely statutory doctrine left to the pleasure of Congress,”
and its perpetual “tinker[ing]” with the doctrine suggests “the Court takes
more ownership of it than more orthodox statutory doctrines.”199  Moreover,
Scott Michelman has argued that even if the Court views qualified immunity
as statutory precedent, evidence that the doctrine has no common-law basis
and fails to meet its policy objectives offer compelling reasons to overrule
that precedent.200
If the Supreme Court is disinclined to overrule qualified immunity, it
could, instead, revisit some of its prior decisions to better align the doctrine
with evidence of its actual role in constitutional litigation.  For example, in
Harlow, the Court eliminated inquiry into officers’ subjective intent so that
qualified immunity could more easily be resolved at summary judgment.201
The Court’s narrow interpretation of “clearly established” law—requiring a
prior finding of unconstitutionality in a very similar case from a circuit or the
Supreme Court—may also be prompted by its interest in facilitating dismissal
at summary judgment.202  But the Court’s subsequent decisions strengthen-
ing summary judgment standards arguably made Harlow unnecessary, as Jus-
tice Kennedy has observed.203  Moreover, evidence that qualified immunity
rarely ends cases at summary judgment confirms that the doctrine is ill-suited
and unnecessary to shield government officials from trial.
The Supreme Court has recognized that its decision in Harlow signifi-
cantly altered qualified immunity doctrine to protect government officials
from the burdens of litigation.  Now, faced with evidence that qualified
197 As things stand, the Justices appear moved by different critiques of qualified immu-
nity, and so it is conceivable that a majority of the Court could vote to eliminate or restrict
qualified immunity on different grounds.  It is premature to consider how an opinion frac-
tured in this way might impact the future of qualified immunity, but for a provocative and
compelling argument about how plurality decisions should be read, see Richard Re, Beyond
the Marks Rule, 132 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
198 See Baude, supra note 2, at 80.
199 Id. at 81.
200 See Scott Michelman, The Branch Best Qualified to Abolish Qualified Immunity, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999 (2018).
201 See generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
202 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851,
866 (2010) (“Much of the problem with ‘clearly established’ law derives from the effort to
devise a substantive standard so narrowly ‘legal’ in character that it can be applied by
courts on summary judgment or a motion to dismiss.”).
203 See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 171 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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immunity does not achieve these intended policy goals, and reasons to
believe that the doctrine jeopardizes interests in government accountability,
it is incumbent on the Court to revisit its standard.  Plaintiffs should be able
to defeat a qualified immunity motion by pointing to evidence of an officer’s
bad faith.204  And the Court should broaden its definition of clearly estab-
lished law—by making clear that courts of appeals can clearly establish the
law, by defining clearly established law at a higher level of factual generality,
and by recognizing obvious constitutional violations, as it did in Hope, with-
out reference to an analogous case.205  These adjustments would better cali-
brate the doctrine’s balance between interests in advancing government
accountability and interests in shielding government officials from litigation
when they have acted reasonably.
Another possibility would be for the Court to keep the framework for
qualified immunity largely intact but allow or encourage lower courts to con-
sider whether qualified immunity would achieve its intended policy goals in
particular cases.  It makes no sense for government officials to receive quali-
fied immunity if they are virtually certain to be indemnified, because those
officials will suffer no financial consequences of a damages award.206  It
makes no sense to ignore evidence of government officials’ subjective intent
if such evidence is available when the qualified immunity motion is being
decided.  And it makes little sense for officials to receive qualified immunity
at or after trial, because the doctrine will do nothing to shield officials in
these cases from burdens associated with litigation.  It should not overtax
lower courts or litigants to take account of this type of evidence when decid-
ing qualified immunity motions.207  Encouraging lower courts to do so would
204 Given her recent concurrence in Wesby, Justice Ginsburg might be sympathetic to
this adjustment to qualified immunity doctrine. See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.
Ct. 577, 594 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment in part).
205 Justice Gorsuch’s opinions on the Tenth Circuit suggest that he might be a vote in
favor of relaxing the Court’s standards for clearly established law. See, e.g., A.M. v. Holmes,
830 F.3d 1123, 1170 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (finding that it was clearly
established that an officer could not arrest a seventh grader for burping in class because
prior decisions did not allow arrest for minor distractions in class, and concluding he
“would have thought this authority sufficient to alert any reasonable officer . . . that arrest-
ing a now compliant class clown for burping was going a step too far”).  For further predic-
tions about Justice Gorsuch’s views on qualified immunity, see Shannon M. Grammel,
Judge Gorsuch on Qualified Immunity, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 163 (2017).
206 If it turns out that other types of government officials more regularly contribute to
settlements and judgments, the Court can factor this evidence into their analysis. See supra
note 43 and accompanying text.
207 The first type of information—regarding a jurisdiction’s indemnification policies
and practices—should be in the possession of the jurisdiction and could be produced in
response to an interrogatory or request for admission.  The second type of information—
evidence of an official’s subjective intent—will presumably be produced by the plaintiff in
opposition to the defendant’s qualified immunity motion, if it is available.  Such informa-
tion may not be available at the motion to dismiss stage, and so may in some cases delay
qualified immunity motion practice until after some discovery, but given the infrequency
with which cases are dismissed on qualified immunity grounds before discovery, and
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be a first step toward more coherence between the application of qualified
immunity and the justifications offered for its existence.
B. Lower Courts
If the Supreme Court continues to issue qualified immunity decisions
that ignore evidence about its fundamental flaws, lower courts may need to
take matters into their own hands.  They have at least two tools at their dispo-
sal.  First, lower courts can do what Richard Re calls “narrowing from
below.”208  Re describes narrowing from below as occurring when a court
interprets Supreme Court precedent “reasonably” but “more narrowly than it
is best read,” and describes narrowing as legitimate when precedent is
“ambiguous.”209  Supreme Court qualified immunity decisions are rife with
ambiguity, and lower courts can decide to read those ambiguous decisions
narrowly.  Indeed, Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in Ziglar can even be
read as an invitation for lower courts to do so.210
For example, the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff can defeat a
qualified immunity motion by showing an obvious constitutional violation,211
but has also suggested that plaintiffs seeking to defeat qualified immunity
must point to a case from the Supreme Court so factually similar that every
officer would be on notice that the conduct at issue was unconstitutional.212
The Supreme Court has regularly reversed (and sometimes chastised) lower
courts for relying on cases to clearly establish the law that are insufficiently
similar to the case at hand.213  But perhaps litigants and lower courts should
rely more heavily on Hope v. Pelzer’s admonition that there need not be a case
on point when the constitutional violation is obvious.214  As another exam-
ple, the Supreme Court has never prohibited courts deciding qualified
immunity motions from considering whether the purposes of qualified
immunity would be advanced in a particular case.  When deciding qualified
immunity motions, lower courts should therefore take into account whether
the defendant bringing the motion is at any risk of personal liability or
defendants’ and judges’ apparent views that qualified immunity is more appropriate at the
summary judgment stage, considering evidence of officers’ subjective intent would not cre-
ate much of a hardship.  And the third type of information—regarding the stage of litiga-
tion at which the motion is brought—will be obvious to the court and parties.
208 See generally Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO.
L.J. 921 (2016).
209 Id. at 925–26.
210 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment).
211 See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
212 See, e.g., Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 665–66 (2012) (“Assuming arguendo that
controlling Court of Appeals’ authority could be a dispositive source of clearly established
law in the circumstances of this case . . . .”).
213 See supra note 3 (describing some of these cases).
214 See generally Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002); see also supra note 205 (suggesting
Justice Gorsuch might be sympathetic to this argument in some cases).
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whether granting the motion would shield the defendant from discovery or
trial.
Judges additionally have significant discretion to manage qualified
immunity litigation practice in their courts and can do so in ways that address
some of the concerns I have raised.  When defendants file frivolous interlocu-
tory appeals of qualified immunity denials, district courts should certify the
appeals as frivolous and refuse to stay the cases.215  When defendants file
nonfrivolous interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity denials, circuit
courts should make every effort to decide those appeals quickly.  District
court judges can require premotion conferences as part of their individual
rules, and can discourage defendants from filing meritless qualified immu-
nity motions that will increase costs and delay.  District and circuit courts’
rulings on qualified immunity motions can answer whether there was an
underlying constitutional violation to assist in the development and articula-
tion of constitutional principles, or explain why they are declining to do
so.216  None of these adjustments strike qualified immunity to the core, but
are small steps that lower courts can take while waiting for the Supreme
Court to make things right.
CONCLUSION
Qualified immunity doctrine is historically unmoored, ineffective at
achieving its policy ends, and detrimental to the development of constitu-
tional law.  Scholarly defenses of the doctrine are similarly unpersuasive.  The
Court should not feel constrained by stare decisis given the questionable
foundations of the doctrine and the liberty the Court has taken with its scope
and structure over the fifty years of its existence.  And there are many ways,
short of downright repeal, that the Court could adjust the doctrine to better
reflect its role in constitutional litigation.  The key question, thus far unan-
swered, is whether the Court will answer these calls for reform.
Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Ziglar offered some hope that the
Court might soon take up these fundamental questions about qualified
immunity.  But the Court’s next qualified immunity decision, in Wesby v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, suggests that we should not hold our collective breath for the
Court to take action.  Just six months after Justice Thomas critiqued qualified
immunity in his concurrence in Ziglar, his opinion in Wesby dutifully applied
the doctrine without comment or critique.217  Despite concerns about quali-
fied immunity previously raised in opinions authored or joined by a majority
of the Court—Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Sotomayor, as well as
Thomas—the Court was unanimous in its conclusion that the officers were
215 For one such decision relying in part on evidence about qualified immunity’s role in
constitutional litigation, see Wheatt v. City of East Cleveland, No. 1:17-CV-377, 2017 WL
6031816 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2017).
216 See Blum, supra note 119, at 1894–96 (offering this same suggestion).
217 District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018).
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entitled to qualified immunity.218  Justice Thomas made no mention of his
concerns that the doctrine looks nothing like the doctrine did in 1871, or
that it is being used to advance the Court’s “freewheeling policy choices.”219
What explains the Court’s continued, vigorous application of qualified
immunity?  It may be simply that the questions that Justice Thomas raised in
Ziglar about qualified immunity were not briefed or argued by the parties in
Wesby,220 and the Court wants a fuller record with which to reassess the doc-
trine.  If so, the Court will not have to wait very long.  The Cato Institute has
begun what it calls a “campaign to challenge and roll back qualified immu-
nity” drawing on “the law and history of the doctrine, its effect on civil rights
litigation, and the implications for police accountability.”221  And plaintiffs’
attorneys have been invoking Justice Thomas’s language in Ziglar in their
petitions for writs of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.222  If
even three Justices agree with Justice Thomas that qualified immunity doc-
trine should be reconsidered, the Court could grant one of these petitions
and could direct the parties to address questions about the doctrine’s com-
mon-law foundations, policy goals, and effects on government accountability
in their briefs.
If the Court continues not to reconsider qualified immunity—despite all
available evidence about the doctrine’s failures, and periodic grumbling by
various Justices about those failures—then something else must be at play.
Perhaps the Court’s continued application of qualified immunity reflects the
218 Id.
219 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1502 (2012)).
220 Note, however, that the ACLU did raise these arguments in its amicus brief in Wesby.
See Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Civil Liberties Union of
the District of Columbia as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, District of Columbia
v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018) (No. 15-1485), 2017 WL 3098276.
221 Qualified Immunity: The Supreme Court’s Unlawful Assault on Civil Rights and Police
Accountability, CATO INST. (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.cato.org/events/qualified-immu-
nity-supreme-courts-unlawful-assault-civil-rights-police-accountability.
222 See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, Shafer v. Padilla, No. 17-1396, 2018 WL 1705603 (Apr. 3, 2018); Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Apodaca v. Raemisch,
2018 WL 1315085 (Mar. 9, 2018); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Melton v. Phillips, No. 17-1095, 2018 WL 722531 (Feb. 2,
2018); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
Noonan v. Cty. of Oakland, No. 17-473, 2017 WL 4386875 (Sept. 27, 2017); Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Doe v. Olson, No. 17-
296, 2017 WL 3701814 (Aug. 23, 2017); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Walker v. Farnan, No. 17-53, 2017 WL 2954392 (July 10,
2017); see also Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, S.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. Booker, No. 17-307, 2017 WL
5714616, at 34 (Nov. 21, 2017) (arguing in opposition to a grant of certiorari but stating
that “if the Court decides to grant certiorari it should add a question presented permitting
it to revisit the doctrine of qualified immunity as a potential alternate ground for
affirmance”).
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Court’s hostility to plaintiffs more generally.  Arthur Miller and Ninth Circuit
Judge Stephen Reinhardt, among others, have argued that the Court’s quali-
fied immunity decisions should be understood as one of many procedural
barriers erected or strengthened by the Roberts Court—including habeas
corpus, civil pleading rules, and class certification requirements—in the
name of protecting government and business defendants from burdens of
litigation.223  Although this theory might explain the votes of some of the
Justices, I do not believe it fully explains the Court’s qualified immunity juris-
prudence.  Several of the Court’s opinions limiting plaintiffs’ access to the
courts through pleading, class certification, and arbitration restrictions have
been hotly contested, resulting in 5–4 decisions with powerful dissents.224
But the four Justices dissenting in Iqbal, Wal-Mart, and Concepcion have joined
many of the Court’s qualified immunity decisions without raising these same
types of concerns.225  I agree that qualified immunity functions much like
these other procedural barriers, that each is justified by interests in protect-
ing defendants from burdensome litigation, that each impedes plaintiffs’
access to the courts, and that each frustrates adjudication of the merits of
plaintiffs’ claims.  But it appears that some or all of the Justices either do not
see qualified immunity doctrine in this way, or believe that qualified immu-
nity properly protects government defendants at plaintiffs’ expense.
My best guess is that members of the Court are reluctant to modify or
eliminate qualified immunity doctrine for fear that doing so might impact
constitutional litigation or policing in some previously unforeseen way that
223 See Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the
Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286 (2013); Ste-
phen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s
Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some
Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1222 n.10 (2015).
224 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
225 See, e.g., White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017); Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042
(2015); City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015); Carroll v. Carman,
135 S. Ct. 348 (2014); Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014); Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056
(2014); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014); Stanton v. Sims, 134 S Ct. 3 (2013); cf.
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
Court for routinely summarily reversing denials of qualified immunity but rarely interven-
ing when courts erroneously grant officers qualified immunity, and expressing concern
that the Court’s qualified immunity decisions “send[ ] an alarming signal to law enforce-
ment officers and the public”); Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 137 S. Ct. 1277, 1282–83
(2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“We have not hesitated to
summarily reverse courts for wrongly denying officers the protection of qualified immunity
in cases involving the use of force.  But we rarely intervene where courts wrongly afford
officers the benefit of qualified immunity in these same cases.  The erroneous grant of
summary judgment in qualified-immunity cases imposes no less harm on ‘society as a
whole,’ than does the erroneous denial of summary judgment in such cases.” (citations
omitted) (quoting Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1774 n.3)); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 313
(2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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would harm “society as a whole.”226  For reasons that I will explain in future
work, I do not believe such fears to have foundation.227  Instead, I predict
that eliminating qualified immunity would not significantly expand the scope
of constitutional protections, dramatically increase the number of filings or
awards, or otherwise open the floodgates to insubstantial claims.  Moreover,
indemnification and budgeting practices would continue to give government
officials limited incentives to comply with the Constitution.  This is not to say
that eliminating qualified immunity would not impact constitutional litiga-
tion.  To the contrary, I believe eliminating qualified immunity would have
important benefits: it would clarify the law, reduce the costs and complexity
of litigation, and shift the focus of Section 1983 litigation to what should be
the critical question at issue in these cases—whether government officials
exceeded their constitutional authority.  The Court might not find these pre-
dictions to be convincing.  But it cannot justify such a significant defense
based on some sense in the air about how constitutional litigation or policing
might be different in qualified immunity’s absence.
A few years ago, Justice Anthony Kennedy gave a speech in which he
observed: “To re-examine your premise is not a sign of weakness of your judi-
cial philosophy.  It’s a sign of fidelity to your judicial oath.”228  I hope that
Justice Kennedy and his colleagues, taking these words to heart, will agree to
reexamine the premises underlying qualified immunity.  And I hope that,
when they do, they take the dramatic action that is compelled by the record.
226 White, 137 S. Ct. at 551 (quoting Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1774 n.3); accord Samuel R.
Bagenstos, Who Is Responsible for the Stealth Assault on Civil Rights?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 893,
911 (2016) (reviewing SARAH STASZAK, NO DAY IN COURT: ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE POLIT-
ICS OF JUDICIAL RETRENCHMENT (2015)) (suggesting that liberal Justices’ sympathy for quali-
fied immunity may be an outgrowth of a “New Democrat” tough-on-crime ideology).
227 See generally Schwartz, supra note 18.
228 Mark Sherman, Justice: Changing Course on the Bench Is Not Weakness, SEATTLE TIMES
(Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/nation-politics/justice-
changing-course-on-the-bench-is-not-weakness/.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-5\NDL502.txt unknown Seq: 44 30-JUL-18 14:35
1840 notre dame law review [vol. 93:5
APPENDIX
This Appendix sets out the holdings in the cases in Nielson and Walker’s
study229 in which courts of appeals found a constitutional violation but
granted qualified immunity because the right was not clearly established.
Case Holding 
Akrawi v. Remillet, 
504 F. App’x 450 
(6th Cir. 2012). 
Finding that Michigan Parole Board’s decision to put 
plaintiff back on parole without a hearing violated his 
due process rights, and awarding plaintiff injunctive 
relief, but affirming the district court’s decision to 
grant officials qualified immunity.  Although the 
Supreme Court established in 1972 that there is a due 
process right to a hearing before being returned to 
prison for a parole violation, it was not clearly 
established that the return to parole constitutes a 
“grievous loss” deserving of procedural protections. 
Amore v. Novarro, 
610 F.3d 155 (2d. 
Cir. 2010), amended 
and superseded by 624 
F.3d 522 (2d Cir. 
2010). 
Finding that plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights 
were violated when officer arrested him under New 
York Penal Law Section 240.35(3) because the statute 
had been ruled unconstitutional by the New York 
Court of Appeals eighteen years before, but reversing 
the district court’s denial of qualified immunity 
because the State of New York had not formally 
repealed section 240.35(3) at the time of plaintiff’s 
arrest. 
Ass’n for Los 
Angeles Deputy 
Sheriffs v. County of 
Los Angeles, 648 
F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
Finding that current and former deputy sheriffs had 
stated a claim that their due process rights were 
violated because the deputies—who had been 
charged with felonies, suspended, reinstated after 
suspension, and then discharged—were not afforded 
postsuspension hearings, but finding the Civil Service 
Commissioners were entitled to qualified immunity 
because, based on a California Court of Appeals 
decision, they “would have believed that denying 
jurisdiction over the appeals of retired deputies was 
lawful.”  (Note that the Ninth Circuit denied 
qualified immunity to the County Supervisors and 
Sheriff, who should have provided an alternative 
hearing for the retired employees.) 
229 Nielson & Walker, supra note 117.
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F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 
2010), withdrawn 
and superseded by 630 
F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
Finding that, taking the facts in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, an officer violated the 
Fourth Amendment when he used a Taser against a 
plaintiff who “was obviously and noticeably unarmed, 
made no threatening statements or gestures, did not 
resist or attempt to flee, but was standing inert twenty 
to twenty-five feet away from the officer,” yet holding 
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity 
because the Ninth Circuit had not previously 
established that Tasers constitute an “intermediate, 
significant level of force that must be justified by the 
government interest involved.”  
Burke v. County of 
Alameda, 586 F.3d 
725 (9th Cir. 2009). 
Finding that, taking the facts in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, defendants violated 
plaintiff’s constitutional right of familial association 
by putting his daughter into protective custody 
without first contacting him to see whether she could 
be put in his care, but holding defendants were 
entitled to qualified immunity because it was not 
clearly established that noncustodial parents had a 
protected interest in the custody and management of 
their children.   
Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of 
Corrections, 642 
F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
Finding that plaintiff’s due process rights were 
violated when his inmate account was assessed—but 
not deducted—without considering available 
evidence “to determine its relevance and suitability 
for use at a disciplinary hearing,” but finding that 
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. 
Although it was established at the time of the action 
that procedural due process rights protected an 
inmate’s account from being debited, it was not 
clearly established that these rights attached before 
an inmate’s account was assessed.  
Castle v. 
Appalachian Tech. 
Coll., 627 F.3d 1366 
(11th Cir. 2010), 
vacated and 
superseded by 631 
F.3d 1994 (11th Cir. 
2011).  
Finding that plaintiff’s due process rights were 
violated when she was not offered a predeprivation 
hearing before being suspended from a nursing 
program, but affirming the lower court’s grant of 
qualified immunity because of “the complicated 
factual issues surrounding the investigation of 
[plaintiff’s] conduct” and because “the 
administrators made known to [plaintiff] that she 
could immediately appeal their determination, which 
[plaintiff] did within a few days.” 
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F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 
2011). 
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, his constitutional rights were violated when 
a police officer “kicked him several times on both 
sides of his body, although he was restrained on the 
ground and offering no resistance,” another officer 
“repeatedly choked and kicked him during the trip to 
the hospital,” and a third officer “extended the 
journey by taking a roundabout route and 
intentionally driving so erratically that [plaintiff] was 
jerked roughly back and forth in his car seat while his 
head was positioned adjacent to the dashboard,” but 
finding defendants were entitled to qualified 
immunity because it was not clearly established in the 
Eighth Circuit that plaintiffs could recover under the 
Fourth Amendment for de minimus injuries. 
Coates v. Powell, 639 
F.3d 471 (8th Cir. 
2011).  
Finding that defendant officer violated plaintiff’s 
Fourth Amendment rights by remaining in the 
plaintiff’s house for ten to fifteen minutes after 
consent was revoked, but finding defendant was 
entitled to qualified immunity because “it was not 
clearly established at the time of this incident that an 
officer was required to leave a private home in the 




F.3d 261 (1st Cir. 
2010). 
Affirming district court decision that former 
employees, whose employment was terminated five 
months shy of the expiration of their one-year 
contracts with the municipality, had a reasonable 
expectation of continued employment with the 
municipality, but finding that officers who fired them 
were entitled to qualified immunity because Puerto 
Rico law was unclear as to whether employees had 
any rights to continued employment once funding 
for their positions ended.  
Cordova v. Aragon, 
569 F.3d 1183 (10th 
Cir. 2009). 
Taking facts in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, officer violated decedent’s constitutional 
rights by shooting him in the back of the head as he 
was driving away—the decedent was driving recklessly 
and was attempting to ram police cars, but no other 
motorists were in the vicinity and the officer was not 
in danger—but finding the officer was entitled to 
qualified immunity because “[t]he law in our circuit 
and elsewhere has been vague on whether the 
potential risk to unknown third parties is sufficient to 
justify the use of force nearly certain to cause death.”  
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Case Holding 
Costanich v. Dep’t 
of Soc. & Health 
Servs., 627 F.3d 
1101 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
Finding that plaintiff “had a Fourteenth Amendment 
due process right to be free from deliberately 
fabricated evidence in a civil child abuse proceeding” 
but finding defendants were entitled to qualified 
immunity because that right was not clearly 
established in the civil context (though it had been 




F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 
2011). 
“Allegations that speech therapist was speaking as a 
citizen, rather than in her capacity as a speech and 
language therapist when providing information to 
clients’ parents about advocacy groups and urging 
them to contact the groups” was sufficient to state a 
First Amendment retaliation claim, but finding 
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity 
because, at the time of the alleged retaliatory action, 
“[t]here was no decision in this circuit explaining the 
scope of a public employee’s employment duties and 
what it means to speak pursuant to those duties, nor 
was there a body of decisions from other circuits that 
could be said to have put [defendant] on clear 
notice. Even though the broad constitutional rule . . . 
may have been clearly established, the contours of 
the right were still cloudy.” 
Delia v. City of 
Rialto, 621 F.3d 
1069 (9th Cir. 
2010), rev’d on other 
grounds Filarsky v. 
Delia, 566 U.S. 377 
(2012).  
Finding that plaintiff’s participation in “internal 
affairs investigation into his off-duty activities was 
coerced by direct threat of sanctions and not 
voluntary, and therefore, violated the Fourth 
Amendment,” but finding the defendants were 
entitled to qualified immunity because “[t]his case 
does not fit neatly into any previous category of 
Fourth Amendment law.” 
Doe ex rel. Johnson 
v. South Carolina 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
597 F.3d 163 (4th 
Cir. 2010). 
Finding that the state violated a child’s substantive 
due process rights when it involuntarily removed her 
from her home and put her a “known, dangerous” 
foster care placement “in deliberate indifference to 
her right to personal safety and security” but finding 
the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity 
because “[i]t would not have been apparent to a 
reasonable social worker in [defendant’s] position 
that her actions violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment.” 
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Case Holding 
Doe ex rel. Magee v. 
Covington Cty. Sch. 
Dist., 649 F.3d 335 
(5th Cir. 2011), reh’g 
en banc 675 F.3d 849 
(5th Cir. 2012). 
Finding that public elementary school had violated 
nine-year-old child’s substantive due process rights by 
allowing an adult male claiming to be her father to 
take her off school grounds without verifying the 
adult’s identity, but finding that defendants were 
entitled to qualified immunity because the Fifth 
Circuit “ha[s] not expressly held that a very young 
child in the custody of a compulsory-attendance 
public elementary school is necessarily in a special 
relationship with that school when it places her in the 
absolute custody of an unauthorized private actor.” 
(Note that, on rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit 
found that plaintiff had not alleged a constitutional 
violation).  
Elkins v. District of 
Columbia, 690 F.3d 
554 (D.C. Cir. 
2012). 
Finding that defendant’s seizure of a notebook in the 
search of a home violated the Fourth Amendment 
when the warrant only authorized visual inspection, 
but finding that the defendant was entitled to 
qualified immunity because she was a junior member 
of the search team and relied on her supervisor’s 
judgment that it was appropriate to seize the 
notebook. 
Elwell v. Byers, 699 
F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 
2012). 
Finding that preadoptive foster parents’ rights to due 
process were violated when a state agency removed 
foster child from their home without any advance 
notice, where there were no immediate concerns or 
emergency justifying lack of process, but finding 
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity 
because it was not clearly established that preadoptive 
parents possess a liberty interest in maintaining their 
family structure. 
Escobar v. Mora, 
496 F. App’x 806 
(10th Cir. 2012). 
Finding that plaintiff stated a claim for an Eighth 
Amendment violation regarding state corrections 
officers’ allegedly spitting into his food, an event that 
caused him to suffer “mental and psychological 
distress and anguish” and lose thirty pounds, but 
finding that defendants were entitled to qualified 
immunity because “there are no controlling decisions 
on point” and prior decisions did not put defendants 
on “fair notice that their conduct rose to the level of 
a constitutional violation.”  
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García-Rubiera v. 
Calderón, 570 F.3d 
442 (1st Cir. 2009). 
Finding that plaintiffs stated a claim that the 
Governor and Secretary of Treasury violated Takings 
and Due Process Clauses by permanent retention of 
accrued interest from duplicate payments of 
premiums under Commonwealth’s compulsory 
motor vehicle liability insurance law, but affirming 
district court’s grant of qualified immunity because 
“the law did not clearly establish that . . . withholding 
any of the designed Reserve . . . [and the interest it 
generates] was an unconstitutional taking” and “the 
law was not clearly established that . . . the custodial 
transfer of funds pursuant to a Commonwealth 
statute and the provision of a compensation 
procedure did not comport with due process 
requirements.” 
Greene v. Camreta, 
588 F.3d 1011 (9th 
Cir 2009), vacated in 
part by 661 F.3d 1201 
(9th Cir. 2011). 
Fourth Amendment rights of a child were violated 
when child protective services caseworker and deputy 
sheriff “seized and interrogated [her] in a private 
office at her school for two hours without a warrant, 
probable cause, or parental consent,” but finding the 
right was not clearly established because prior 
decisions concerned children searched or seized at 
home, among other reasons.  (Note that the decision 
was appealed, the Supreme Court vacated as moot 
the portion of the opinion addressing the Fourth 
Amendment issue, and so the Ninth Circuit’s 2011 
opinion vacated the court’s decision about the 
Fourth Amendment.) 
Harman v. Pollock, 
586 F.3d 1254 (10th 
Cir. 2009). 
Finding that officers’ search of plaintiffs’ apartment 
could not be justified by exigent circumstances, but 
concluding that officers were entitled to qualified 
immunity because “we cannot say the Officers’ 
actions were plainly incompetent or knowing 
violations of the law.” 
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Henry v. Purnell, 
619 F.3d 323 (4th 
Cir. 2010), reh’g en 
banc 652 F.3d 524 
(4th Cir. 2011). 
Finding that material disputes exist about the 
reasonableness of an officer’s actions who fired his 
Glock instead of a Taser and failed to warn the victim 
before doing so, failed to utilize the laser sight, and 
failed to distinguish the different safety locks, but 
concluding that officer was entitled to qualified 
immunity because he would not know that “an act of 
weapon confusion of the firearm for the taser was 
‘clearly established’ as an excessive use of force under 
the Fourth Amendment.”  (Note that on rehearing 
en banc, the Fourth Circuit reversed and found no 
qualified immunity.) 
Hopkins v. 
Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 
752 (9th Cir. 2009). 
Finding that the defendant officers violated the 
plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights when they 
arrested him following a citizen’s arrest without 
“independent probable cause,” but granting officers 
qualified immunity.  The Ninth Circuit had 
previously held police officers must have 
independent probable cause when effectuating a 
municipal bus driver’s citizen arrest, but it was 
unclear whether the same rules would apply for 
arrests made by a person who is not “acting as an 
agent of the state.” 
Hunt v. County of 
Orange, 672 F.3d 
606 (9th Cir. 2012). 
Finding that plaintiff’s First Amendment rights were 
violated when he was placed on administrative leave 
and then demoted for campaign speech, and finding 
that this right was clearly established, but concluding 
that the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity 
because a reasonable official in defendant’s position 
would not have known that the plaintiff was not a 
policymaker whose political loyalty was important to 
the effective performance of his job. 
Koch v. Lockyer, 
340 F. App’x 372 
(9th Cir. 2009). 
Finding that defendants violated plaintiff’s Fourth 
Amendment rights when they forcibly collected his 
DNA without a warrant because he was not convicted 
of an offense that required DNA collection, but 
concluding that the defendant was entitled to 
qualified immunity; given “the complexity and 
novelty of the issues presented” in the case, 
“reasonable officials could not have understood that 
their actions violated Koch’s constitutional rights.” 
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Kozel v. Duncan, 
421 F. App’x 843 
(10th Cir. 2011). 
Finding that the sheriff violated plaintiffs’ Fourth 
Amendment rights when his deputies seized patrons 
of a dance club “for over an hour and lined them up 
for sobriety checks,” but concluding that the sheriff is 
entitled to qualified immunity.  “While the 
proscription against warrantless ‘wholesale searches 
and seizures’ of a business open to the public is well 
established, it is too general to provide notice that 
officers violate a bar owner’s constitutional rights by 
detaining patrons for sobriety checks after receiving 
reports of underage drinking in a bar with a cup 
policy that may facilitate underage drinking.” 
Melgar v. Greene, 
593 F.3d 348 (4th 
Cir. 2010). 
Finding that officer may have violated the plaintiff’s 
Fourth Amendment rights by using a patrol dog 
without a muzzle and with a long lead to find a 
missing boy, but concluding that the defendant was 
entitled to qualified immunity; although there were 
other cases finding constitutional violations for the 
use of police dogs who were released from their 
leashes when searching for criminals, in this case the 
dog was kept on a leash to locate a missing person. 
“Cases addressing the former simply do not provide 
sufficient guidance to officers in the latter situation.”  
Moss v. Martin, 614 
F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 
2010). 
Finding that plaintiff’s First Amendment rights were 
violated when he was fired on the basis of his political 
beliefs, but concluding that the defendants were 
entitled to qualified immunity.  Although the 
government cannot take most employees’ political 
beliefs into account, there is an exception for 
positions involving “confidential or policymaking 
responsibilities.”  “Given the uncertainty that litigants 
encounter in this somewhat murky area of the law, it 
is difficult for a plaintiff to avoid a qualified immunity 
defense in a case of first impression unless she 
occupies a low rung on the bureaucratic ladder.” 
Randall v. Scott, 610 
F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 
2010). 
Finding that plaintiff’s First Amendment rights were 
violated when he was fired for running for political 
office but concluding that defendants were entitled 
to qualified immunity; although there is an 
established “constitutional right to run for office,” the 
court was “aware of no precedential case with similar 
facts.” 
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Reher v. Vivo, 66 
F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 
2011). 
Finding that officer did not have probable cause to 
arrest plaintiff for disorderly conduct based only on 
information that plaintiff had been accused of going 
go a park to look at and videotape children and that 
a crowd at the park was upset, but concluding the 
officer was entitled to qualified immunity because, 
under the circumstances, the officer “could have 
reasonably, but mistakenly, believed” that probable 
cause existed. 
Rivers v. Fischer, 
390 F. App’x 22 (2d 
Cir. 2010). 
Finding that plaintiff’s constitutional rights were 
violated when the “Department of Corrections 
administratively imposed a 5-year term of supervised 
release that was not orally pronounced by the 
sentencing judge,” and that right was established in a 
2010 case from the Second Circuit, but finding 
qualified immunity was appropriate because the case 
had not yet been decided when the sentence in this 
case was imposed. 
Rock for Life—
UMBC v. 
Hrabowski, 411 F. 
App’x 541 (4th Cir. 
2010). 
Finding that defendants may have violated plaintiffs’ 
First Amendment rights by relocating their Genocide 
Awareness Project display, but concluding defendants 
were entitled to qualified immunity because it was a 
reasonable mistake.  “If the defendants secured 
campus safety at too high a cost to the plaintiffs’ right 
to free expression, we do not believe they should be 
made to pay for this mistake from their own pockets.” 
Saavedra v. 
Scribner, 482 F. 
App’x 268 (9th Cir. 
2012). 
Finding that a state prisoner’s due process rights were 
violated because he got inadequate notice of the 
charges against him before being put into 
administrative segregation, and inadequate notice of 
subsequent disciplinary proceedings, but finding that 
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity 
“[b]ecause our cases do not give adequate guidance 
both regarding the level of specificity required in 
a . . . notice and on ensuring timely delivery” of 
notice of charges, and because “[i]t would not be 
apparent to a prison official that he needed to 
disclose more than [the charge and some factual 
basis for the charge] in a notice to initiate 
disciplinary proceedings, especially where a portion 
of the evidence used to support the disciplinary 
action was legitimately confidential.” 
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-5\NDL502.txt unknown Seq: 53 30-JUL-18 14:35
2018] the  case  against  qualified  immunity 1849
Case Holding 
San Geronimo 
Caribe Project v. 
Acevedo-Vila, 650 
F.3d 826 (1st Cir. 
2011), reh’g en banc, 
687 F.3d 465 (1st 
Cir. 2012). 
Finding that developer stated a claim that his due 
process rights were violated when construction 
permits were held in abeyance for sixty days despite 
the fact that construction was under way, but 
concluding defendants were entitled to qualified 
immunity because prior precedent “could have led 
the defendants to believe that they were not required 
to provide a meaningful predeprivation hearing and 
that . . . providing postdeprivation remedies was all 
the process that was due.”  (Note that, at rehearing 
en banc, the First Circuit found no procedural due 
process violation.) 
Schmidt v. Creedon, 
639 F.3d 587 (3d 
Cir. 2011). 
Finding that, taking the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, his due process rights were 
violated because he had a right to a hearing before 
being suspended from his job, but concluding 
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The 
Supreme Court had established that, “absent 
extraordinary circumstances, certain state employees 
were entitled to a hearing prior to termination,” but 
“it was not clearly established in 2006 whether this 
rule applied when appropriate post-suspension union 
grievance procedures were available to suspended 
employees.” 
Schwenk v. County 
of Alameda, 364 F. 
App’x 336 (9th Cir. 
2010).  
Finding that mother had a legal basis to challenge 
the seizure of her son, based on a Ninth Circuit case 
decided in 2009 holding that “parents with legal 
custody, regardless of whether they also possess 
physical custody of their children have a liberty 
interest in the care, custody, and management of 
their children,” but affirming the district court’s 
dismissal of the case on qualified immunity grounds 
because “[a]t the time of the alleged conduct, we had 
not yet decided” that case. 
Scott v. Fischer, 616 
F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 
2010).  
Finding that the administrative imposition of 
mandatory postrelease supervision without a judicial 
sentence violated the plaintiff’s due process rights, 
but concluding that qualified immunity was 
appropriate because the Second Circuit decision 
clearly establishing this right had not yet been 
decided when the plaintiff’s sentence was imposed.  
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Solis v. Oules, 378 F. 
App’x 642 (9th Cir. 
2010).  
Finding that defendant officer “violated [plaintiff’s] 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures when he stopped 
her vehicle and apparently removed her from it 
under a law that did not criminalize her behavior,” 
but concluding that defendant was entitled to 
qualified immunity because the officer’s mistake 
“would not have been necessarily clear to a 
reasonable officer under the circumstances” given 
“uncertainty on the face of the statute.”  
Stoot v. City of 
Everett, 582 F.3d 
910 (9th Cir. 2009). 
Finding that defendant officer violated juvenile’s 
Fourth Amendment rights by seizing him and 
interviewing him regarding suspected child 
molestation but finding the officer was entitled to 
qualified immunity because plaintiffs “have not cited 
a single case squarely holding that an officer cannot 
rely solely on the statements of a child sexual assault 
victim obtained during a personal interview to 
establish probable cause.” 
Taravella v. Town of 
Wolcott, 599 F.3d 
129 (2d Cir. 2010). 
Finding that plaintiff alleged a violation of her due 
process rights when she was fired from her 
government job, but finding defendant was entitled 
to qualified immunity because her employment 
agreement was ambiguous and “it cannot be said that 
the defendant acted unreasonably when he 
interpreted the ambiguous contract one way instead 
of another.”  
Thompson v. 
Williams, 320 F. 
App’x 678 (9th Cir. 
2009).  
Finding that there were triable issues about whether a 
prison’s policy not to provide the plaintiff with a 
Halal or Kosher diet violated his First Amendment 
rights or RLUIPA, but concluding that “it was not 
clearly established at the time of the violation” that 
the defendants were required to do so.  
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Toevs v. Reid, 646 
F.3d 752 (10th Cir. 
2011), amended and 
superseded, 685 F.3d 
903 (10th Cir. 
2012). 
Finding that plaintiff’s due process rights were 
violated because he was not informed of the reasons 
he was recommended for or denied progression in a 
stratified incentive program in a prison, but 
concluding defendants were entitled to qualified 
immunity.  Although the Supreme Court “clearly 
established that prisoners cannot be placed 
indefinitely in administrative segregation without 
receiving meaningful periodic reviews,” “it was not 
clearly established in 2005 through 2009 that the 
review process was inadequate” and “this court has 
never considered the due-process implications of a 
stratified incentive program.” 
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